--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@hailer/mcp/v/1.3.52" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@hailer/mcp/v/1.3.52.md" package: "@hailer/mcp" report_status: "published" title: "@hailer/mcp@1.3.52 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "1.3.52" --- # @hailer/mcp@1.3.52 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 1.3.52 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The postinstall hook automatically installs package-owned Claude skills into the consumer project, creating an agent extension lifecycle risk. The inspected source shows first-party Hailer guidance and a narrowly scoped localhost port update, with no concrete malicious behavior. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 91.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-12T20:03:49.224Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-12T20:04:49.167Z - **Download time:** 1032 ms - **Static scan time:** 4420 ms - **AI review time:** 54490 ms - **Total time:** 59943 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The npm postinstall hook automatically copies the package's Claude skills into the consumer project. This is first-party agent extension setup and warrants a warning. - **Trigger:** Installing the package with npm, which runs its postinstall hook. - **Impact:** The package can add or replace Claude skill files in the consumer project, affecting later agent sessions. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.cjs, .claude/skills/hailer-api-client/SKILL.md, dist/server/mcp-server.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-12T20:04:49.167Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The hook finds the project root and recursively copies the package's .claude directory into the project's .claude directory, with limited protection for existing settings.local.json files. - **Rationale:** The postinstall hook automatically installs package-owned Claude skills into the consumer project, creating an agent extension lifecycle risk. The inspected source shows first-party Hailer guidance and a narrowly scoped localhost port update, with no concrete malicious behavior. - **Files touched:** .claude/, scripts/postinstall.cjs, package.json ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The package's postinstall hook runs scripts/postinstall.cjs., The hook recursively copies the package's .claude directory into the consumer project's .claude directory, overwriting existing files except settings.local.json., The copied content includes Hailer-specific Claude skill guidance., On server startup, the package updates an existing .mcp.json entry only for the hailer server's localhost port., The inspected source shows no malicious payload or credential transfer in this agent setup behavior. - **Evidence against:** The installed skills are first-party Hailer guidance, and the .mcp.json update is limited to the existing hailer localhost port argument. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @hailer/mcp@1.3.52. - Review the evidence and your use of @hailer/mcp@1.3.52 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.cjs ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.cjs ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 7. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Install-time AI-agent control hijack evidence: L2: /** L3: * postinstall: Copies .claude/ (agents, skills, hooks) to the project root. L4: * Runs automatically after `npm install @hailer/mcp`. ... L30: if (!fs.existsSync(src)) return; L31: fs.mkdirSync(dest, { recursive: true }); L32: ... L41: if (entry.name === 'settings.local.json' && fs.existsSync(destPath)) continue; L42: fs.copyFileSync(srcPath, destPath); L43: } ... L54: L55: const src = path.join(__dirname, '..', '.claude'); L56: const dest = path.join(projectRoot, '.claude'); Payload evidence from .claude/skills/create-and-publish-app/SKILL.md: L60: 2. `src/hailer/use-app.ts` — `StoreSet` `replace?: boolean` → `replace?: false` (zustand v5 `tsc` fix). L61: 3. `src/App.tsx` — `process.env.NODE_ENV` → `import.meta.env.MODE` (the sc ``` ### 8. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 9. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 10. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** scripts/build-public-chat-knowledge.py - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```python path = scripts/build-public-chat-knowledge.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 3462 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 11. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 12. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ### 13. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/bot/services/operation-logger.js\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 33 ``` ### 14. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/mcp/publish-auth-injector.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/mcp/publish-auth-injector.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/scaffold-cli/app-codegen.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/scaffold-cli/app-codegen.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 16. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/scaffold-cli/bootstrap.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/scaffold-cli/bootstrap.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 17. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/server/config.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/server/config.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 18. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/mcp/tools/file.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/mcp/tools/file.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 19. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/mcp/utils/file-upload.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/mcp/utils/file-upload.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 20. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/public-chat/graduate.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/public-chat/graduate.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 21. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/server/mcp-server.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.49 matchedPath = dist/server/mcp-server.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.49 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 22. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/mcp/tools/workflow-shared.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/mcp/tools/workflow-shared.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 23. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/mcp/workspace-admin-store.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/mcp/workspace-admin-store.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 24. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/smoke-public-chat-live.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = scripts/smoke-public-chat-live.ts matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 14 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 19 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 14 ### Published dependency entries - @anthropic-ai/sdk ^0.54.0 (Dependency) - @hailer/cli ^1.2.1 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/api-logs ^0.219.0 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/exporter-logs-otlp-proto ^0.219.0 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/resources ^2.8.0 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/sdk-logs ^0.219.0 (Dependency) - cors ^2.8.5 (Dependency) - docx ^9.7.1 (Dependency) - exceljs ^4.4.0 (Dependency) - express ^4.21.2 (Dependency) - form-data ^4.0.4 (Dependency) - mammoth ^1.12.0 (Dependency) - pdfkit ^0.15.2 (Dependency) - zod ^3.24.1 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @hailer/mcp - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.3.52 - **Version published:** 2026-08-28T16:44:12.610Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-28T11:24:34.908Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-18T08:35:46.017Z - **Known versions:** 8 - **Latest version:** 1.7.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** MCP server for Hailer - provides 52 tools to AI assistants (Claude Desktop, Claude Code). - **Maintainers:** hailer-support - **Artifact files:** 536 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 3,517,052 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()