--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@hailer/mcp/v/1.3.57" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@hailer/mcp/v/1.3.57.md" package: "@hailer/mcp" report_status: "published" title: "@hailer/mcp@1.3.57 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "1.3.57" --- # @hailer/mcp@1.3.57 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 1.3.57 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The package automatically modifies the project’s Claude skill directory during npm installation. The inspected content is a first-party Hailer skill, so this fits agent extension lifecycle risk and does not establish a publish-blocking attack. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-12T20:03:54.310Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-12T20:05:05.675Z - **Download time:** 758 ms - **Static scan time:** 4377 ms - **AI review time:** 66229 ms - **Total time:** 71365 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The npm install hook automatically adds package-owned Claude skills to the consuming project. This is a first-party agent extension setup, so it warrants a warning; no separate malicious behavior was established. - **Trigger:** Installing the package with lifecycle scripts enabled. - **Impact:** The project’s Claude Code skills are modified and the bundled Hailer instructions become available to the agent. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.cjs, .claude/skills/create-and-publish-app/SKILL.md - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-12T20:05:05.675Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The postinstall script copies the bundled .claude directory into the project root, recursively adding its skills. - **Rationale:** The package automatically modifies the project’s Claude skill directory during npm installation. The inspected content is a first-party Hailer skill, so this fits agent extension lifecycle risk and does not establish a publish-blocking attack. - **Files touched:** scripts/postinstall.cjs, .claude/skills/ ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The package runs scripts/postinstall.cjs automatically after installation., The install script recursively copies the bundled .claude directory into the consuming project’s .claude directory., The bundled content includes a Hailer app creation and publishing skill for Claude Code., Server startup also calls an updater for an existing .mcp.json file. - **Evidence against:** The inspected .claude directory contains skills only; no hook files appeared in its file listing., The .mcp.json update is reached during server startup, separate from the npm install hook. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @hailer/mcp@1.3.57. - Review the evidence and your use of @hailer/mcp@1.3.57 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.cjs ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.cjs ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 7. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Install-time AI-agent control hijack evidence: L2: /** L3: * postinstall: Copies .claude/ (agents, skills, hooks) to the project root. L4: * Runs automatically after `npm install @hailer/mcp`. ... L30: if (!fs.existsSync(src)) return; L31: fs.mkdirSync(dest, { recursive: true }); L32: ... L41: if (entry.name === 'settings.local.json' && fs.existsSync(destPath)) continue; L42: fs.copyFileSync(srcPath, destPath); L43: } ... L54: L55: const src = path.join(__dirname, '..', '.claude'); L56: const dest = path.join(projectRoot, '.claude'); Payload evidence from .claude/skills/create-and-publish-app/SKILL.md: L60: 2. `src/hailer/use-app.ts` — `StoreSet` `replace?: boolean` → `replace?: false` (zustand v5 `tsc` fix). L61: 3. `src/App.tsx` — `process.env.NODE_ENV` → `import.meta.env.MODE` (the sc ``` ### 8. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 9. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 10. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** scripts/build-public-chat-knowledge.py - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```python path = scripts/build-public-chat-knowledge.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 3462 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 11. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 12. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ### 13. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/bot/services/operation-logger.js\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 29 ``` ### 14. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/mcp/publish-auth-injector.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/mcp/publish-auth-injector.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/scaffold-cli/app-codegen.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/scaffold-cli/app-codegen.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 16. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/scaffold-cli/bootstrap.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/scaffold-cli/bootstrap.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 17. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/server/config.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/server/config.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 18. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/mcp/tools/file.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/mcp/tools/file.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 19. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/mcp/utils/file-upload.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/mcp/utils/file-upload.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 20. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/public-chat/graduate.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/public-chat/graduate.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 21. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/server/mcp-server.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/server/mcp-server.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 22. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/mcp/tools/workflow-shared.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/mcp/tools/workflow-shared.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 23. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/mcp/workspace-admin-store.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = dist/mcp/workspace-admin-store.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 24. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** scripts/smoke-public-chat-live.ts - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```typescript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @hailer/mcp@1.3.56 matchedPath = scripts/smoke-public-chat-live.ts matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhaWxlci9tY3A:1.3.56 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 14 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 19 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 14 ### Published dependency entries - @anthropic-ai/sdk ^0.54.0 (Dependency) - @hailer/cli ^1.2.1 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/api-logs ^0.219.0 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/exporter-logs-otlp-proto ^0.219.0 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/resources ^2.8.0 (Dependency) - @opentelemetry/sdk-logs ^0.219.0 (Dependency) - cors ^2.8.5 (Dependency) - docx ^9.7.1 (Dependency) - exceljs ^4.4.0 (Dependency) - express ^4.21.2 (Dependency) - form-data ^4.0.4 (Dependency) - mammoth ^1.12.0 (Dependency) - pdfkit ^0.15.2 (Dependency) - zod ^3.24.1 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @hailer/mcp - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.3.57 - **Version published:** 2026-09-18T07:10:59.077Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-28T11:24:34.908Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-18T08:35:46.017Z - **Known versions:** 8 - **Latest version:** 1.7.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** MCP server for Hailer - provides 52 tools to AI assistants (Claude Desktop, Claude Code). - **Maintainers:** hailer-support - **Artifact files:** 540 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 3,598,240 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()