---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@harrylabsj/kiwi/v/0.8.0"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@harrylabsj/kiwi/v/0.8.0.md"
package: "@harrylabsj/kiwi"
report_status: "published"
title: "@harrylabsj/kiwi@0.8.0 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.8.0"
---

# @harrylabsj/kiwi@0.8.0 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 18 findings warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Credential exfiltration
- **Selected version:** 0.8.0
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The inspected source supports a conditional credential exposure risk because a configurable gateway receives stored credentials without a destination allowlist. The default is Radius’s intended service, so the evidence does not establish a concrete attack or malicious intent.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 78.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-25T19:48:42.033Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-25T19:53:45.506Z
- **Download time:** 760 ms
- **Static scan time:** 4807 ms
- **AI review time:** 297904 ms
- **Total time:** 303473 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The Radius provider can send a stored credential to its configured gateway during model refresh. This is conditional credential exposure when an operator configures an unrestricted gateway.

- **Trigger:** A Radius provider refresh runs with network access enabled and a stored OAuth credential or API key.

- **Impact:** A gateway configured by the operator could receive the credential. The default gateway is Radius’s service endpoint, and the inspected source does not establish credential theft or malicious intent.

- **Evidence paths:** .lpm-dependency-evidence-5544ea48-f780-4ef4-88a9-1fc72fd5d70d/1/npm-linux/dist/providers/radius.js, .lpm-dependency-evidence-5544ea48-f780-4ef4-88a9-1fc72fd5d70d/1/npm-linux/dist/providers/radius-config.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-25T19:53:45.506Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The provider passes the credential to a request for the gateway’s \`/v1/config\` endpoint as a Bearer authorization header; the source shows no destination allowlist.

- **Rationale:** The inspected source supports a conditional credential exposure risk because a configurable gateway receives stored credentials without a destination allowlist. The default is Radius’s intended service, so the evidence does not establish a concrete attack or malicious intent.

- **Network endpoints:** https://radius.pi.dev

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 78.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The Radius provider accepts a configurable gateway and defaults to the Radius gateway., When network access is allowed, refresh passes the stored OAuth access token or API key to that gateway’s configuration request as a Bearer credential., The request targets the configured gateway’s \`/v1/config\` endpoint without a destination allowlist.

- **Evidence against:** The package manifest exposes \`dist/cli.js\` and has only a \`prepublishOnly\` build hook., The default Radius gateway is a package-aligned service endpoint; source does not establish hidden credential collection or a package-controlled unrelated recipient.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @harrylabsj/kiwi@0.8.0.

- Review the evidence and your use of @harrylabsj/kiwi@0.8.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 2. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 3. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/demo/demo-runner.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@harrylabsj/kiwi@0.8.0/dist/demo/demo-runner.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L31: import { existsSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
L32: import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
L33: import net from "node:net";
```

### 4. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package source references shell execution.

### 5. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** dist/weixin/channel.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@harrylabsj/kiwi@0.8.0/dist/weixin/channel.js>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L7: *
L8: *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
L9: *
...
L65: this.timings = { ...DEFAULT_WEIXIN_TIMINGS, ...options.timings };
L66: this.log = options.log ?? ((line) => process.stderr.write(`${line}\n`));
L67: this.now = options.now ?? (() => new Date().toISOString());
```

### 6. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 7. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 8. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 9. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** dist/demo/demo-runner.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@harrylabsj/kiwi@0.8.0/dist/demo/demo-runner.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L173: async function startDemoCatalog(records) {
L174: const configuredDir = process.env.KIWI_CATALOG_DIR;
L175: const catalogDir = configuredDir !== undefined && configuredDir !== ""
...
L183: const port = await findFreePort();
L184: const url = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
L185: const child = spawn(catalogPython(catalogDir), ["-m", "kiwi_catalog.scripts.kiwi_catalog_api", "--db", db, "--host", "127.0.0.1", "--port", String(port)], { cwd: catalogDir, stdio:...
L186: // Drain service output so a noisy verification worker cannot fill the pipe.
```

### 10. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@harrylabsj/kiwi@0.8.0/dist/cli.js>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1400: });
L1401: process.stdout.write(`[merchant up] 域名 ${domain} · 端口 ${port} · Caddyfile ${caddyfilePath}\n`);
L1402: // ── 检查 Caddy 是否安装（fail-closed）──
L1403: const caddyOk = spawnSync("caddy", ["version"], { stdio: "ignore" }).status === 0;
L1404: if (!caddyOk) {
L1405: process.stderr.write("未检测到 Caddy（反代 + TLS）。请先安装：`brew install caddy`（或 https://caddyserver.com/download），然后重试。\n");
L1406: return EXIT.CONFIG;
```

### 11. High: Cloud Metadata Access
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/a2a/client/url-policy.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@harrylabsj/kiwi@0.8.0/dist/a2a/client/url-policy.js>)

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L7: *
L8: *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
L9: *
...
L25: * - 主机名先做保留主机名检查，再在请求前 DNS 解析复查解析出的 IP（DNS
L26: *   rebinding 的基础缓解；`allowPrivateRanges` 可显式逃生）。
L27: *
...
L34: */
L35: import { lookup } from "node:dns/promises";
L36: import { isIP } from "node:net";
```

### 12. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@harrylabsj/kiwi@0.8.0/dist/cli.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.exports -> dist/cli.js
L1400: });
L1401: process.stdout.write(`[merchant up] 域名 ${domain} · 端口 ${port} · Caddyfile ${caddyfilePath}\n`);
L1402: // ── 检查 Caddy 是否安装（fail-closed）──
L1403: const caddyOk = spawnSync("caddy", ["version"], { stdio: "ignore" }).status === 0;
L1404: if (!caddyOk) {
L1405: process.stderr.write("未检测到 Caddy（反代 + TLS）。请先安装：`brew install caddy`（或 https://caddyserver.com/download），然后重试。\n");
L1406: return EXIT.CONFIG;
```

### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 14. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 15. Medium: Ships Build Helper
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%
- **Path:** contracts/conformance/python-service/run.py
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@harrylabsj/kiwi@0.8.0/contracts/conformance/python-service/run.py>)

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```python
path = contracts/conformance/python-service/run.py
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 4523
magicHex = [redacted]
```

### 16. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 17. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** dist/operator/controller.js\#virtual:normalized:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@harrylabsj/kiwi@0.8.0/dist/operator/controller.js%23virtual%3Anormalized%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 5
```

### 18. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** dist/cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@harrylabsj/kiwi@0.8.0/dist/cli.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = @harrylabsj/kiwi@0.7.16
matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhcnJ5bGFic2ova2l3aQ:0.7.16
similarity = 0.775
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 5
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 13
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 5

### Published dependency entries
- @earendil-works/pi-agent-core 0.83.0 (Dependency)
- @earendil-works/pi-ai 0.83.0 (Dependency)
- ajv 8.20.0 (Dependency)
- ajv-formats 3.0.1 (Dependency)
- yaml 2.9.0 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @harrylabsj/kiwi
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.8.0
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Version published:** 2026-09-04T00:16:27.491Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-08T23:33:24.664Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-20T10:38:40.733Z
- **Known versions:** 44
- **Latest version:** 0.12.32
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Kiwi: standalone A2A commerce negotiation agent runtime (Pi Agent Core + shopping-cli Commerce API)
- **Maintainers:** harrylabsj
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22
- **Artifact files:** 848
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 4,937,909 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** Yes
- **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@harrylabsj/kiwi/v/0.8.0>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/harrylabsj/kiwi>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/harrylabsj/kiwi#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/harrylabsj/kiwi/issues>)
