--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@hashbrownai/angular/v/0.8.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@hashbrownai/angular/v/0.8.0.md" package: "@hashbrownai/angular" report_status: "published" title: "@hashbrownai/angular@0.8.0 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.8.0" --- # @hashbrownai/angular@0.8.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 12 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Data Exfiltration - **Selected version:** 0.8.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. Source confirms default installation telemetry that can include persistent installation identity and configured Git email, with opt-outs but no affirmative-consent gate. The endpoint is package-aligned and the event is installation-related, so the evidence supports a warning rather than a publish block. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 84.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-23T04:27:46.839Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-23T04:28:57.178Z - **Download time:** 520 ms - **Static scan time:** 228 ms - **AI review time:** 69590 ms - **Total time:** 70339 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The postinstall hook sends installation telemetry by default, including a persistent installation identifier and, outside CI, configured Git identity. This creates an installation-time disclosure risk, although the recipient is package-aligned. - **Trigger:** A package manager runs the package’s postinstall hook. - **Impact:** Installation metadata and potentially identifying Git details are disclosed to the package vendor without affirmative opt-in. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, install/postinstall.cjs, install/collector.cjs, install/policy.cjs, install/git-context.cjs - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-23T04:28:57.178Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The hook collects installation and environment details, discovers Git identity, and sends the event to the default hashbrown.dev endpoint unless an opt-out is set. - **Rationale:** Source confirms default installation telemetry that can include persistent installation identity and configured Git email, with opt-outs but no affirmative-consent gate. The endpoint is package-aligned and the event is installation-related, so the evidence supports a warning rather than a publish block. - **Files touched:** package.json, install/postinstall.cjs, install/collector.cjs, install/policy.cjs, install/git-context.cjs - **Network endpoints:** https://hashbrown.dev/\_/growth/collect/v1/install ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The postinstall hook automatically invokes the install collector., The collector sends package installation events with a persistent installation identifier and package, platform, runtime, and environment details., The collector includes discovered Git identity, including a configured email, in non-CI events., The default recipient is hashbrown.dev; endpoint overrides are accepted only for loopback hosts., Collection is disabled only when a recognized opt-out variable is set. - **Evidence against:** The telemetry endpoint is on the package vendor’s hashbrown.dev domain, and the event concerns package installation., The collector supports opt-out variables and avoids adding Git identity in CI. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @hashbrownai/angular@0.8.0. - Review the evidence and your use of @hashbrownai/angular@0.8.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node install/postinstall.cjs ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node install/postinstall.cjs ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 7. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 8. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** install/git-context.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @threadplane/ag-ui@0.2.0 matchedPath = install/git-context.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:QHRocmVhZHBsYW5lL2FnLXVp:0.2.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 9. Medium: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() The postinstall hook automatically invokes the install collector. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json "postinstall": "node install/postinstall.cjs" } } ``` ### 10. Medium: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** install/postinstall.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() The postinstall hook automatically invokes the install collector. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript collectInstall({ packageRoot: require('node:path').join(__dirname, '..'), }), ).then(stop, stop); } catch { clearTimeout(deadline); stop(); } } ``` ### 11. Medium: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** install/collector.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() The collector sends package installation events with a persistent installation identifier and package, platform, runtime, and environment details. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript eventId: randomUUID(), kind: 'package.installed', occurredAt: now().toISOString(), collectorVersion: 'install-v1', subject: { ...subject, namespace: 'installation' }, ...(installationToken ? { installationToken } : {}), properties: { packageName: pkg.name, packageVersion: pkg.version, osFamily: os.platform(), architecture: o ``` ### 12. Medium: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** install/git-context.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() The collector includes discovered Git identity, including a configured email, in non-CI events. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript identity.gitEmail = email; origins.push(Object.hasOwn(local, 'email') ? 'local' : 'global'); } if (origins.length) identity.gitConfigOrigin = new Set(origins).siz ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 3 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 3 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 6 ### Published dependency entries - @cacheplane/partial-json 0.3.0 (Dependency) - @cacheplane/partial-markdown 0.5.12 (Dependency) - tslib ^2.3.0 (Dependency) - @angular/common ^22.0.0 (PeerDependency) - @angular/core ^22.0.0 (PeerDependency) - @hashbrownai/core 0.8.0 (PeerDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @hashbrownai/angular - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.8.0 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-10-23T04:25:25.835Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-13T04:01:57.308Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-29T20:21:09.630Z - **Known versions:** 8 - **Latest version:** 0.8.3 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Angular bindings for Hashbrown AI - **Maintainers:** mikeryan52, blove - **Keywords:** hashbrown, angular, generative-ui, ai, typescript - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 13 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 574,939 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()