--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@hashbrownai/bedrock" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@hashbrownai/bedrock/report.md" package: "@hashbrownai/bedrock" report_status: "published" title: "@hashbrownai/bedrock@0.8.0 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "0.8.0" --- # @hashbrownai/bedrock@0.8.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — Installation discloses identifying installation and development-environment information to the package publisher’s endpoint without installer consent. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Data Exfiltration - **Selected version:** 0.8.0 - **Selected version is latest:** Yes - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The package performs unconsented install-time disclosure of identifying installation and development-environment data to a publisher-selected endpoint. The automatic lifecycle trigger and constrained endpoint support blocking under the installation beacon policy. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 99.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-23T04:29:51.975Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-23T04:30:21.896Z - **Download time:** 1020 ms - **Static scan time:** 143 ms - **AI review time:** 28758 ms - **Total time:** 29921 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The automatic postinstall hook reports an installation event to Hashbrown’s fixed collector endpoint. It sends an installation identifier and environment details, and may include Git identity and repository information outside CI. - **Trigger:** Installation runs the package’s postinstall lifecycle hook. - **Impact:** Installation discloses identifying installation and development-environment information to the package publisher’s endpoint without installer consent. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, install/postinstall.cjs, install/collector.cjs, install/policy.cjs, install/identity.cjs, install/git-context.cjs - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-23T04:30:21.896Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The hook gathers installation and environment data, then posts it as JSON to the default collector; only affirmative environment opt-outs disable collection. - **Attack narrative:** During installation, the postinstall hook automatically collects a persistent installation ID and package and environment details, then sends them to the fixed Hashbrown collector endpoint. Outside CI, the event can also include Git identity and repository details. The endpoint override accepts only loopback addresses, and collection proceeds unless an affirmative opt-out flag is set. - **Rationale:** The package performs unconsented install-time disclosure of identifying installation and development-environment data to a publisher-selected endpoint. The automatic lifecycle trigger and constrained endpoint support blocking under the installation beacon policy. - **Files touched:** package.json, install/postinstall.cjs, install/collector.cjs, install/policy.cjs, install/identity.cjs, install/git-context.cjs - **Network endpoints:** https://hashbrown.dev/\_/growth/collect/v1/install ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for block:** The package runs install/postinstall.cjs automatically from its postinstall lifecycle hook, which activates collectInstall., The install collector sends an installation event to the fixed https://hashbrown.dev/\_/growth/collect/v1/install endpoint; overrides are restricted to loopback hosts., The event includes a persistent per-user installation ID and package, OS, architecture, Node, and package-manager details. Outside CI it can also include Git identity and repository details; telemetry is disabled only by affirmative opt-out environment flags. - **Evidence against:** The collector has a short timeout and does not follow redirects; these controls limit the request but do not prevent its default disclosure. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @hashbrownai/bedrock@0.8.0. - Avoid installing @hashbrownai/bedrock@0.8.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node install/postinstall.cjs ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node install/postinstall.cjs ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 7. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 8. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** install/git-context.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @threadplane/ag-ui@0.2.0 matchedPath = install/git-context.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:QHRocmVhZHBsYW5lL2FnLXVp:0.2.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 9. High: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** install/git-context.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @hashbrownai/bedrock@0.7.0 matchedIdentity = npm:QGhhc2hicm93bmFpL2JlZHJvY2s:0.7.0 similarity = 0.400 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ### 10. High: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() The package runs install/postinstall.cjs automatically from its postinstall lifecycle hook, which activates collectInstall. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json "postinstall": "node install/postinstall.cjs" } } ``` ### 11. High: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Path:** install/postinstall.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() The package runs install/postinstall.cjs automatically from its postinstall lifecycle hook, which activates collectInstall. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript process.env.npm[redacted] === 'postinstall' ) { const stop = () => process.exit(0); const deadline = setTimeout(stop, 4800); try { const { collectInstall } = requir ``` ### 12. High: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Path:** install/postinstall.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() The package runs install/postinstall.cjs automatically from its postinstall lifecycle hook, which activates collectInstall. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript collectInstall({ packageRoot: require('node:path').join(__dirname, '..'), }), ).then(stop, stop); } catch { clearTimeout(deadline); stop(); } } ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 3 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 1 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 4 ### Published dependency entries - @ag-ui/core 1.0.2 (Dependency) - @hashbrownai/core 0.8.0 (Dependency) - tslib ^2.3.0 (Dependency) - @aws-sdk/client-bedrock-runtime ^3.1106.0 (PeerDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @hashbrownai/bedrock - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.8.0 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-10-23T04:28:12.199Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-13T04:01:53.364Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-23T04:30:21.896Z - **Known versions:** 5 - **Latest version:** 0.8.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Amazon Bedrock provider for Hashbrown AI - **Keywords:** hashbrown, amazon-bedrock, generative-ui, ai, typescript - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 25 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 79,382 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** Yes ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()