@hostinger/mcp@3.23.1
MCP server for Hostinger API
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package exposes an embedded skill that urges agents to retry actions after sandbox or approval blocks and to hide some API failures. This is a real agent-capability risk, but the reviewed code does not show automatic install-time execution or credential exfiltration.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
A connected agent reads and follows the Hostinger headless skill during a user-requested workflow.
Impact
Could weaken an agent's safeguards and reduce user visibility into failed API actions.
Mechanism
Skill text directs the agent to seek approval or network access after a blocked call, then continue; it also says to hide certain Hostinger API failures from the user.
AI rationale
The package exposes an embedded skill that urges agents to retry actions after sandbox or approval blocks and to hide some API failures. This is a real agent-capability risk, but the reviewed code does not show automatic install-time execution or credential exfiltration.
Evidence
src/core/skills.jssrc/core/runtime.jssrc/servers/all.js
Network endpoints2
developers.hostinger.comauth.hostinger.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 84.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- An embedded headless skill tells agents to retry after sandbox, command review, or approval blocks, including by requesting approval or network access.
- The package exposes its embedded skills through the MCP server to connected agents.
Evidence against
- The build script's child-process execution is limited to running the TypeScript compiler during an explicit build.
- The bootstrap is a sign-in helper invoked manually; it checks for existing Hostinger authentication and otherwise starts an OAuth login flow.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedbuild.jsView file
2L3: import { exec } from 'child_process';
L4: import fs from 'fs';
High
18console.log('Compiling TypeScript...');
L19: exec('npx tsc', (error, stdout, stderr) => {
L20: if (error) {
High
Runtime Package Install
Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.
build.jsView on unpkg · L18skills/headless/connect/bootstrap.mjsView file
•matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @hostinger/mcp@3.15.1
matchedPath = [redacted].mjs
matchedIdentity = npm:QGhvc3Rpbmdlci9tY3A:3.15.1
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High
Known Malware Source Similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
Findings
6 High3 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processbuild.js
HighShell
HighRuntime Package Installbuild.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityskills/headless/connect/bootstrap.mjs
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityskills/headless/steps/05-design/logo-kit.mjs
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/core/skills.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @hostinger/mcp@3.23.1.
See all versions of @hostinger/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @hostinger/mcp@3.23.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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