@hrmony/kit-5@1.0.1

The package's preinstall script and its main entry (index.js) both perform identical credential-harvesting: they query the EC2 Instance Metadata Service (IMDSv2) at 169.254.169.254 for the identity document and IAM role security credentials, enumerate the entire process.env, and recursively read /var/run/secrets/ (Kubernetes service-account tokens and mounted secrets). The collected data is POSTed to a hardcoded attacker-controlled host at hrnmn.dd.h4x.tv (paths /save_instance_info_hook from preinstall and /save_instance_info_index from index.js). The destination is unrelated to any legitimate package purpose, there is no user configuration, and the behavior fires automatically on `npm install` via the preinstall lifecycle hook as well as on any `require()`/`import` of the package. The harvested material — temporary AWS IAM credentials, cloud instance identity, arbitrary environment variables (which routinely contain API keys, tokens, and database credentials in CI/build environments), and Kubernetes service-account tokens — grants immediate cross-service access to the installer's cloud and cluster resources.