registry / @hrmony/pladddform-cli / 40.14.3

@hrmony/pladddform-cli@40.14.3

AI Security Review

scanned 9d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The main entrypoint actively collects cloud credentials, environment variables, and Kubernetes secret files, then sends them to an external host. This is a confirmed data-exfiltration surface.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Importing or running the package main entrypoint.

Impact

Cloud credentials, instance metadata, environment secrets, and Kubernetes-mounted secrets can be disclosed to the external recipient.

Mechanism

Top-level code requests AWS metadata, enumerates process environment values, recursively reads /var/run/secrets/, and posts JSON to the external exporter URL.

Attack narrative

When its declared main entrypoint is loaded, the package makes an external request and then attempts AWS metadata collection. It retrieves instance identity and role credentials, posts the collected object to an external host, copies all process environment variables, recursively reads Kubernetes secrets, and posts those values to the same host. The behavior is automatic and unrelated to an apparent CLI function.

AI rationale

The active entrypoint implements automatic secret collection and export to an unrelated external host. This is concrete credential and data exfiltration.

Evidence

index.js/var/run/secrets/

Network endpoints2

hrnmn.dd.h4x.tv/save_instance_info_from_pkge_hrmony_pladddform-cli169.254.169.254

OSV advisory

On require/import, index.js performs three attacker-benefiting actions against a hardcoded endpoint at https://hrnmn.dd.h4x.tv/. First, it POSTs an unconditional install/import beacon ({'c53':'hello'}) to that host. Second, aws_get() contacts the EC2 Instance Metadata Service at 169.254.169.254, obtains an IMDSv2 token, enumerates IAM roles under /iam/security-credentials/, and retrieves each role's temporary AWS credentials along with user-data and the instance identity document, then POSTs them to the same host. Third, local_get() enumerates every entry in process.env and recursively reads files under /var/run/secrets/ (Kubernetes service-account tokens and mounted secrets) and POSTs the aggregated dump to the same host. The destination domain is unrelated to any AWS, Kubernetes, or legitimate telemetry provider, and the exfiltrated material (IAM instance-role STS credentials, environment variables, and Kubernetes secret material) enables immediate cloud-account and cluster takeover. The package name '@hrmony/pladddform-cli' also resembles a legitimate 'harmony/platform-cli' identifier with letter alterations consistent with typosquatting.

@hrmony/pladddform-cli@40.14.3

AI Security Review

OSV advisory

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Source & flagged code