registry / @hrmony/pladddform-testing / 40.14.3

@hrmony/pladddform-testing@40.14.3

AI Security Review

scanned 9d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The main entry point actively collects cloud, environment, and Kubernetes-secret data and transmits it to an external host. No user action beyond importing the package is required.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Importing index.js through the package main entry point.

Impact

Cloud credentials, service tokens, environment secrets, and instance metadata may be exposed to an unrelated remote endpoint.

Mechanism

Top-level code invokes AWS and local collection routines, reads environment variables and Kubernetes secrets, and sends JSON requests to the external exporter.

Attack narrative

When imported, the package sends a request to an external exporter, queries AWS instance metadata including IAM-related paths, and sends collected information outward. It also captures all environment variables, recursively reads Kubernetes secrets, and posts both to that same external endpoint. The routines are invoked by top-level code.

AI rationale

The active import-time entry point harvests credentials and sensitive runtime data and exfiltrates it to an unrelated external host. This is concrete credential and data exfiltration behavior.

Evidence

index.js/var/run/secrets/

Network endpoints2

hrnmn.dd.h4x.tv/save_instance_info_from_pkge_hrmony_pladddform-testing169.254.169.254

OSV advisory

On module import, index.js executes an unconditional exfiltration payload against the installer/runtime host. It queries the AWS EC2 Instance Metadata Service at http://169.254.169.254 using IMDSv2 to enumerate the instance identity document, user-data, IAM role names, and the per-role temporary security credentials. It also enumerates every entry of process.env and recursively reads all files under /var/run/secrets/ (the standard Kubernetes service-account and secret mount). The combined data is POSTed to the hardcoded attacker endpoint https://hrnmn.dd.h4x.tv/save_instance_info_from_pkge_hrmony_pladddform-testing, and a separate top-level fetch to the same host beacons successful execution. The package ships no legitimate functionality: its only substantive file is the exfil script, the description is empty, and the name (@hrmony/pladddform-testing) plus the exfil URL path segment (pkge_hrmony_pladddform-testing) match a typosquat/dependency-confusion shape targeting an internal or similarly named scope.

@hrmony/pladddform-testing@40.14.3

AI Security Review

OSV advisory

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Source & flagged code