@iga-pages/cli@1.1.7
A CLI tool for IGA Pages
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a user-invoked deployment CLI with default telemetry, but the inspected source masks secret-bearing fields and contains no lifecycle hook, hidden persistence, or confirmed credential exfiltration. The flagged dynamic evaluation is a bundled protobuf dependency pattern rather than a remote-code path.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The invoked CLI sends command telemetry to ByteDance endpoints by default.
- Telemetry includes command metadata and invocation context, creating a limited privacy surface.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- Telemetry masks configured and common secret-bearing parameter names.
- Credentials are stored locally in a restricted-permission auth file.
- The eval use is bundled protobuf optional-module loading, not remote code execution.
- Child-process use supports explicit CLI build, development, and git actions; no hidden trigger was found.
Source & flagged code
15 flaggedSource sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/index.jsView on unpkgSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L97Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @iga-pages/cli@1.1.7.
See all versions of @iga-pages/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @iga-pages/cli@1.1.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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