registry / @iicp/client / 0.7.76

@iicp/client@0.7.76

Use the open IICP AI mesh from TypeScript or JavaScript without running a node

AI Security Review

scanned 15d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface was established. Risky primitives are tied to explicit CLI provider workflows, optional dependency installation, auto-update, or tunnel setup rather than install/import-time execution.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

User runs `iicp-node` commands such as `serve`, `init`, `service install`, or `mcp-gateway`.

Impact

Package can contact service endpoints and modify user IICP/service config during CLI use, but no unconsented exfiltration or malicious lifecycle behavior was found.

Mechanism

user-invoked provider SDK networking, local config writes, optional subprocesses

Rationale

Static inspection shows a legitimate IICP client/provider CLI with user-invoked networking, config persistence, optional tunnel spawning, and documented auto-update behavior, but no lifecycle execution or data theft. The scanner findings are explained by package-aligned provider-node functionality rather than a malicious payload.

Evidence

package.jsondist/index.jsdist/cli.jsdist/updater.jsdist/tunnel.jsdist/identity.jsdist/operator_crypto.jsdist/service.jsdist/client.js

Network endpoints7

iicp.network/apiregistry.npmjs.org/@iicp/client/latestcloudflare-dns.com/dns-query*.trycloudflare.comapi.ipify.orgapi.anthropic.comlocalhost:11434

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 86.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

dist/updater.js contains default-on serve-time self-update via `npm install -g @iicp/client@latest`.
dist/tunnel.js can spawn an existing `cloudflared` binary for Quick Tunnel when serve/NAT fallback is used.
dist/cli.js `init` may run `npm install --no-save` for optional peer deps after interactive user confirmation.

Evidence against

package.json has no install/preinstall/postinstall lifecycle hooks.
dist/index.js only re-exports SDK modules; no import-time execution beyond requires.
Network traffic is package-aligned: IICP directory, backend probes, npm version check, Cloudflare tunnel health/DNS checks.
Identity code stores operator/node config under user IICP config and explicitly omits operator secret/contact from public views.
MCP gateway requires explicit `--tools` allowlist and blocks shell/interpreter tool names.
No credential harvesting, destructive behavior, persistence outside user-invoked service install, or AI-agent control-surface mutation found.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 41 file(s), 477 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.anthropic.com, api.ipify.org, api6.ipify.org, cloudflare-dns.com, iicp.network, pkg.cloudflare.com, registry.npmjs.org, schemas.xmlsoap.org

Source & flagged code

5 flagged

dist/tunnel.jsView file

Lines 2-42javascript

2// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

3/**

4 * Quick-Tunnel escalation — #520 rung 5 of the NAT ladder.

5 * TypeScript port of iicp-client-python/tunnel.py (0f97ca1).

6 *

7 * When every NAT variant fails (no direct endpoint, no UPnP pinhole, no IPv6

8 * GUA, no relay-capable peer in the directory), the node can still become

9 * publicly reachable with ZERO account, domain, or router changes: spawn

10 * `cloudflared tunnel --url http://127.0.0.1:<port>` and register the issued

11 * `https://*.trycloudflare.com` URL as the endpoint.

12 *

13 * Lifecycle is fully automatic: setup (binary detection — never auto-installed),

14 * initiation (spawn + URL parse ≤20 s), supervision (bounded respawn; URL

15 * rotates → caller re-registers), teardown (close() idempotent + process-exit

16 * hook so a normal exit never orphans the child).

17 */

18Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });

19exports.QuickTunnel = exports.INSTALL_HINT = exports.TUNNEL_DEAD_RETRY_MAX_MS = exports.TUNNEL_DEAD_RETRY_INITIAL_MS = exports.TUNNEL_CREATE_LEASE_MS = exports.TUNNEL_CREATE_MIN_INTERVAL_MS = exports.TUNNEL_RATE_LIMIT_COOLDOWN_MS = exports.TUNNEL_DOH_TIMEOUT_MS = exports.TUNNEL_VERIFY_TIMEOUT_MS

20exports.__resetQuickTunnelRateLimitForTests = __resetQuickTunnelRateLimitForTests;

21exports.cloudflaredPath = cloudflaredPath;

22exports.openQuickTunnel = openQuickTunnel;

23const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process");

24const fs = require("node:fs");

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/tunnel.jsView on unpkg · L22

25const os = require("node:os");

26const path = require("node:path");

27const URL_RE = /https:\/\/[a-z0-9-]+\.trycloudflare\.com/;

28/** cloudflared usually prints the URL within ~5 s; 20 s covers slow first runs. */

29exports.TUNNEL_START_TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000;

30/**

31 * Bounded self-healing: this many CONSECUTIVE failed respawns (without the tunnel

32 * recovering to a healthy state in between) → give up. Resets to 0 once a respawned

33 * tunnel passes a health check, so a long-running relay heals indefinitely. (#538)

34 */

35exports.MAX_RESPAWNS = 3;

36/**

37 * Active liveness check of the tunnel's OWN public URL — catches the failure mode the

38 * process-exit watcher misses: cloudflared still running but the edge connection

39 * dropped, so the URL is unreachable while the node looks healthy (the recurring

40 * dead-endpoint bug, #538). Probe every interval; after this many consecutive failures,

41 * force a tunnel restart (kill → exit hook respawns → new URL → re-register).

42 */

dist/node.jsView file

Lines 693-733javascript

693 _checkNonce(nonce) {

694 if (!nonce)

695 return true;

696 const now = Date.now();

697 // Evict expired nonces

698 for (const [k

dist/client.jsView file

Lines 1-27javascript

1"use strict";

2/**

3 * IicpClient — primary entrypoint for the IICP TypeScript SDK (ADR-016 §1).

4 * Implements SDK-01..SDK-06 conformance rules.

5 */

6Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });

7exports.IicpClient = void 0;

8const

dist/cli.jsView file

Lines 313-353javascript

313 return "ollama";

314 return "custom";

315 }

316 if (await ok("/api/version"))

317 return "ollama";

318 return "custom";

Source & flagged code

5 flagged · loading source

dist/tunnel.jsView file

22exports.openQuickTunnel = openQuickTunnel; L23: const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); L24: const fs = require("node:fs");

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/tunnel.jsView on unpkg · L22

dist/node.jsView file

713// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any L714: this._prom = await eval('import("prom-client")'); L715: this._tasksCounter = new this._prom.Counter({

Low

Eval

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

dist/node.jsView on unpkg · L713

dist/client.jsView file

7exports.IicpClient = void 0; L8: const node_crypto_1 = require("node:crypto"); L9: const errors_js_1 = require("./errors.js");

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/client.jsView on unpkg · L7

dist/cli.jsView file

1888const _MCP_DANGEROUS = new Set([ L1889: "bash", "sh", "zsh", "fish", "shell", "powershell", "pwsh", "cmd", L1890: "exec", "execute", "run_command", "run", "system", "eval", ... L1899: if (helpFlag) { L1900: process.stdout.write(`usage: iicp-node mcp-gateway [options]\n\n` + L1901: `Bridge a local MCP server into the IICP mesh as a registered provider node.\n\n` + L1902: `Options:\n` + L1903: ` --mcp-url URL IICP_MCP_URL — MCP server base URL (default http://localhost:8001)\n` + L1904: ` --tools NAMES IICP_MCP_TOOLS — comma-separated tool names to advertise (required)\n` +

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L1888

333try { L334: (0, node_child_process_1.execSync)(`npm install --no-save ${extras.join(" ")}`, { stdio: "inherit" }); L335: process.stdout.write(" ✓ done\n");

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L333

Findings

4 High4 Medium5 Low

HighChild Processdist/tunnel.js

HighShell

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js

HighRuntime Package Installdist/cli.js

MediumDynamic Requiredist/client.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowEvaldist/node.js

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Source & flagged code

5 flagged

dist/tunnel.jsView file

Lines 2-42javascript

2// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

3/**

4 * Quick-Tunnel escalation — #520 rung 5 of the NAT ladder.

5 * TypeScript port of iicp-client-python/tunnel.py (0f97ca1).

6 *

7 * When every NAT variant fails (no direct endpoint, no UPnP pinhole, no IPv6

8 * GUA, no relay-capable peer in the directory), the node can still become

9 * publicly reachable with ZERO account, domain, or router changes: spawn

10 * `cloudflared tunnel --url http://127.0.0.1:<port>` and register the issued

11 * `https://*.trycloudflare.com` URL as the endpoint.

12 *

13 * Lifecycle is fully automatic: setup (binary detection — never auto-installed),

14 * initiation (spawn + URL parse ≤20 s), supervision (bounded respawn; URL

15 * rotates → caller re-registers), teardown (close() idempotent + process-exit

16 * hook so a normal exit never orphans the child).

17 */

18Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });

20exports.__resetQuickTunnelRateLimitForTests = __resetQuickTunnelRateLimitForTests;

21exports.cloudflaredPath = cloudflaredPath;

22exports.openQuickTunnel = openQuickTunnel;

23const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process");

24const fs = require("node:fs");

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/tunnel.jsView on unpkg · L22

25const os = require("node:os");

26const path = require("node:path");

27const URL_RE = /https:\/\/[a-z0-9-]+\.trycloudflare\.com/;

28/** cloudflared usually prints the URL within ~5 s; 20 s covers slow first runs. */

29exports.TUNNEL_START_TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000;

30/**

31 * Bounded self-healing: this many CONSECUTIVE failed respawns (without the tunnel

32 * recovering to a healthy state in between) → give up. Resets to 0 once a respawned

33 * tunnel passes a health check, so a long-running relay heals indefinitely. (#538)

34 */

35exports.MAX_RESPAWNS = 3;

36/**

37 * Active liveness check of the tunnel's OWN public URL — catches the failure mode the

38 * process-exit watcher misses: cloudflared still running but the edge connection

39 * dropped, so the URL is unreachable while the node looks healthy (the recurring

40 * dead-endpoint bug, #538). Probe every interval; after this many consecutive failures,

41 * force a tunnel restart (kill → exit hook respawns → new URL → re-register).

42 */

dist/node.jsView file

Lines 693-733javascript

693 _checkNonce(nonce) {

694 if (!nonce)

695 return true;

696 const now = Date.now();

697 // Evict expired nonces

698 for (const [k

dist/client.jsView file

Lines 1-27javascript

1"use strict";

2/**

3 * IicpClient — primary entrypoint for the IICP TypeScript SDK (ADR-016 §1).

4 * Implements SDK-01..SDK-06 conformance rules.

5 */

6Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });

7exports.IicpClient = void 0;

8const

dist/cli.jsView file

Lines 313-353javascript

313 return "ollama";

314 return "custom";

315 }

316 if (await ok("/api/version"))

317 return "ollama";

318 return "custom";

Lines 1868-1908javascript

1868 if (argv[0] === "--version" || argv[0] === "-V") {

1869 process.stdout.write(`iicp-node ${SDK_VERSION}\n`);

1870 return 0;

1871 }

1872 try {

1873 return await dispatch(argv);

1874 }

1875 catch (exc) {

1876 if (exc instanceof CliError) {

1877 process.stderr.write(`ERROR: ${exc.message}\n`);

1878 return 2;

1879 }

1880 throw exc;

1881 }

1882}

1883// ── mcp-gateway (#512) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────

1884// Backstop denylist on top of the operator's explicit --tools allowlist

1885// (red-team pass 3): shells/interpreters/exec primitives never to expose, even

1886// by accident. The required --tools allowlist + allow_tool_execution opt-in are

1887// the primary controls; this is a best-effort safety net.

1888const _MCP_DANGEROUS = new Set([

1889 "bash", "sh", "zsh", "fish", "shell", "powershell", "pwsh", "cmd",

1890 "exec", "execute", "run_command", "run", "system", "eval",

1891 "python", "python3", "node", "ruby", "perl", "subprocess", "popen", "spawn",

1892]);

1893function _toolToIntent(name) {

1894 const safe = name.toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9_]/g, "_");

1895 return `urn:iicp:intent:mcp:${safe}:v1`;

1896}

1897async function runMcpGateway(argv) {

1898 const helpFlag = argv.includes("--help") || argv.includes("-h");

1899 if (helpFlag) {

1900 process.stdout.write(`usage: iicp-node mcp-gateway [options]\n\n` +

1901 `Bridge a local MCP server into the IICP mesh as a registered provider node.\n\n` +

1902 `Options:\n` +

1903 ` --mcp-url URL IICP_MCP_URL — MCP server base URL (default http://localhost:8001)\n` +

1904 ` --tools NAMES IICP_MCP_TOOLS — comma-separated tool names to advertise (required)\n` +

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L1888

1905 ` --node-id ID IICP_NODE_ID — auto-generated if absent\n` +

1906 ` --public-endpoint U IICP_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT — externally reachable URL of this gateway\n` +

1907 ` --directory-url URL IICP_DIRECTORY_URL (default https://iicp.network/api/v1)\n` +