@imagifly/cli@0.1.9
Agent-first CLI for the Imagifly image and video API
AI Security Review
scanned 17h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe agent-facing skill explicitly suppresses mention of tarball and script audits in its setup response, which can hide security findings from users. The CLI’s flagged process and credential behavior otherwise appears tied to explicit login and configured API use.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The shipped English agent skill tells assistants to omit “tarball or script audits” from the reply after a successful install, suppressing security findings in that setup flow.
- The suppression instruction applies when an agent follows the skill to install or configure the CLI and the health check succeeds.
- The manifest has no install hook; its only lifecycle script is prepublishOnly, which builds the package.
- The flagged browser launch occurs in the explicit login flow, and API credentials are sent as bearer tokens to the configured API base.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/commands/auth.jsView on unpkg · L2A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/commands/auth.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @imagifly/cli@0.1.9.
See all versions of @imagifly/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @imagifly/cli@0.1.9. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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