registry / @inboost-pro/inboost-ai-proxy / 0.3.3

@inboost-pro/inboost-ai-proxy@0.3.3

Local inference proxy and reliability gateway for Claude Code, Cursor, OpenHands, and Cline

AI Security Review

scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The lifecycle performs automatic first-party agent setup across global and project configuration files, creating a residual agent extension risk. The inspected behavior supports a warning, but does not establish credential theft or another concrete attack.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Installing the package through npm runs its postinstall hook.

Impact

This changes agent configuration and behavior on install. The inspected hook does not start the service or send credentials.

Mechanism

The hook writes agent skill files and appends rules that direct model requests through the local proxy and shape agent workflow.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonbin/inboost-proxy.js.claude/skills/inboost-proxy/SKILL.md.claude/CLAUDE.md.claude/commands/inboost.md.cursor/rules/inboost-proxy.mdc

Network endpoints1

localhost:8080/v1

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The package postinstall script runs the CLI with its postinstall flag.
That install path calls the agent setup routine, which writes global and project agent files across several tools.
The setup adds proxy and workflow instructions to those files, changing agent behavior without a setup prompt.
The postinstall handler exits after setup, and the inspected path does not start the proxy service or send credentials.

Evidence against

The added instructions configure the package's local proxy and describe editing and verification practices; the inspected lifecycle path shows no credential transfer.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 1 file(s), 41.6 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.anthropic.com, api.siliconflow.com, github.com, inboost.pro, raw.githubusercontent.com, www.apple.com

Source & flagged code

12 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/inboost-proxy.js --postinstall

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/inboost-proxy.js --postinstall

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView file

15L16: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L17: const path = require("path"); ... L19: const os = require("os"); L20: const http = require("http"); L21: const https = require("https"); ... L200: function installIDESkills(verbose = true) { L201: const homeDir = os.homedir(); L202: const cwd = process.cwd(); ... L299: try { L300: const isWindows = process.platform === "win32"; L301: const cmd = isWindows ? "where" : "which";

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg · L15

208if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) { L209: fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true }); L210: } L211: fs.writeFileSync(filePath, content, { encoding: "utf-8" }); L212: installedPaths.push(filePath); ... L222: if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) { L223: fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true }); L224: } ... L229: } L230: fs.writeFileSync(filePath, existing.trimEnd() + "\n" + snippet, "utf-8"); L231: } else { L232: const fullContent = (initialHeader ? initialHeader + "\n" : "") + snippet.trim() + "\n";

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg · L208

15Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.postinstall -> bin/inboost-proxy.js L15: L16: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L17: const path = require("path"); ... L19: const os = require("os"); L20: const http = require("http"); L21: const https = require("https"); ... L200: function installIDESkills(verbose = true) { L201: const homeDir = os.homedir(); L202: const cwd = process.cwd(); ... L299: try { L300: const isWindows = process.platform === "win32"; L301: const cmd = isWindows ? "where" : "which";

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg · L15

15L16: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L17: const path = require("path");

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg · L15

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg · L15

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. function safewrite(filepath, content) { try { const dir = path.dirname(filepath); if (!fs.existssync(dir)) { fs.mkdirsync(dir, { recursive: true }); } fs.writefilesync(filepath, content, { encoding: "utf-8" }); installedpaths.push(filepath); return true; } catch (e) { return false; } } function safeappend(filepath, marker, snippet, initialheader = "") { try { const dir = path.dirname(filepath); if (!fs.existssync(dir)) { fs.mkdirsync(dir, { recursive: true }); } if (fs.existssync(filepath)) { const existing = fs.readfilesync(filepath, "utf-8"); if (existing.incl

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg

15Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.postinstall -> bin/inboost-proxy.js L15: L16: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L17: const path = require("path"); ... L19: const os = require("os"); L20: const http = require("http"); L21: const https = require("https"); ... L200: function installIDESkills(verbose = true) { L201: const homeDir = os.homedir(); L202: const cwd = process.cwd(); ... L299: try { L300: const isWindows = process.platform === "win32"; L301: const cmd = isWindows ? "where" : "which";

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg · L15

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @inboost-pro/inboost-proxy@0.3.3 matchedPath = bin/inboost-proxy.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.3.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = a8cb82bcd8432fc2 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @inboost-pro/inboost-proxy@0.3.3 matchedPath = bin/inboost-proxy.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.3.3 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 1 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg · L15

Source & flagged code

12 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/inboost-proxy.js --postinstall

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/inboost-proxy.js --postinstall

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView file

Critical

Findings

3 Critical7 High5 Medium4 Low

CriticalDownload Executebin/inboost-proxy.js

CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackbin/inboost-proxy.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitybin/inboost-proxy.js

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processbin/inboost-proxy.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitybin/inboost-proxy.js

HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationbin/inboost-proxy.js

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencebin/inboost-proxy.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybin/inboost-proxy.js

HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturebin/inboost-proxy.js

MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @inboost-pro/inboost-ai-proxy@0.3.3.

See all versions of @inboost-pro/inboost-ai-proxy for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @inboost-pro/inboost-ai-proxy@0.3.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-19 13:20:23.111Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Related packages

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Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Related packages

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Source & flagged code