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@inboost-pro/inboost-proxy@0.3.1: AI-agent control-surface risk | LPM Firewall

registry / @inboost-pro/inboost-proxy / 0.3.1

@inboost-pro/inboost-proxy@0.3.1

Local inference proxy and reliability gateway for Claude Code, Cursor, OpenHands, and Cline (alias package)

AI Security Review

scanned 1d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

LPM flags this version as an AI-agent control-surface risk. The automatic install hook changes project and home-directory configuration for several AI coding agents. It installs package-branded skills and instructions that steer agents to use the local proxy.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Installing the package with npm, which invokes postinstall.

Impact

Agent behavior and model routing are changed for the project and user account after package installation.

Mechanism

The hook invokes the installer, which writes or appends files in Claude Code, Cursor, OpenHands, and other agent configuration locations without a consent prompt.

Policy narrative

Installing the package automatically runs its postinstall handler. That handler writes and appends package-provided skills and rules to project and home configuration locations used by multiple AI coding agents, without a separate consent step. The rules alter agent instructions and direct model requests through the local proxy. This is unconsented install-time mutation of a broad agent control surface.

AI rationale

The postinstall hook performs unconsented writes to multiple AI-agent configuration surfaces in both the project and user home. Under the install control-surface policy, this warrants blocking as agent control hijacking, even though the inspected installer content routes agents to the package's local proxy.

Evidence

package.jsonbin/inboost-proxy.js.claude/skills/inboost-proxy/SKILL.md.claude/CLAUDE.md.claude/commands/inboost.md

Source & flagged code

12 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/inboost-proxy.js --postinstall

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node bin/inboost-proxy.js --postinstall

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView file

15L16: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L17: const path = require("path"); ... L19: const os = require("os"); L20: const http = require("http"); L21: const https = require("https"); ... L200: function installIDESkills(verbose = true) { L201: const homeDir = os.homedir(); L202: const cwd = process.cwd(); ... L299: try { L300: const isWindows = process.platform === "win32"; L301: const cmd = isWindows ? "where" : "which";

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg · L15

208if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) { L209: fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true }); L210: } L211: fs.writeFileSync(filePath, content, { encoding: "utf-8" }); L212: installedPaths.push(filePath); ... L222: if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) { L223: fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true }); L224: } ... L229: } L230: fs.writeFileSync(filePath, existing.trimEnd() + "\n" + snippet, "utf-8"); L231: } else { L232: const fullContent = (initialHeader ? initialHeader + "\n" : "") + snippet.trim() + "\n";

Critical

Ai Agent Control Hijack

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg · L208

15Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.postinstall -> bin/inboost-proxy.js L15: L16: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L17: const path = require("path"); ... L19: const os = require("os"); L20: const http = require("http"); L21: const https = require("https"); ... L200: function installIDESkills(verbose = true) { L201: const homeDir = os.homedir(); L202: const cwd = process.cwd(); ... L299: try { L300: const isWindows = process.platform === "win32"; L301: const cmd = isWindows ? "where" : "which";

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg · L15

15L16: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L17: const path = require("path");

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg · L15

15L16: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L17: const path = require("path"); ... L19: const os = require("os"); L20: const http = require("http"); L21: const https = require("https"); ... L200: function installIDESkills(verbose = true) { L201: const homeDir = os.homedir(); L202: const cwd = process.cwd(); ... L299: try { L300: const isWindows = process.platform === "win32"; L301: const cmd = isWindows ? "where" : "which";

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg · L15

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. function safewrite(filepath, content) { try { const dir = path.dirname(filepath); if (!fs.existssync(dir)) { fs.mkdirsync(dir, { recursive: true }); } fs.writefilesync(filepath, content, { encoding: "utf-8" }); installedpaths.push(filepath); return true; } catch (e) { return false; } } function safeappend(filepath, marker, snippet, initialheader = "") { try { const dir = path.dirname(filepath); if (!fs.existssync(dir)) { fs.mkdirsync(dir, { recursive: true }); } if (fs.existssync(filepath)) { const existing = fs.readfilesync(filepath, "utf-8"); if (existing.incl

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg

15Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.postinstall -> bin/inboost-proxy.js L15: L16: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L17: const path = require("path"); ... L19: const os = require("os"); L20: const http = require("http"); L21: const https = require("https"); ... L200: function installIDESkills(verbose = true) { L201: const homeDir = os.homedir(); L202: const cwd = process.cwd(); ... L299: try { L300: const isWindows = process.platform === "win32"; L301: const cmd = isWindows ? "where" : "which";

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg · L15

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = inboost-proxy@0.3.1 matchedPath = bin/inboost-proxy.js matchedIdentity = npm:aW5ib29zdC1wcm94eQ:0.3.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 928ce774b7e360f7 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = inboost-proxy@0.3.1 matchedPath = bin/inboost-proxy.js matchedIdentity = npm:aW5ib29zdC1wcm94eQ:0.3.1 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 1 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg

15L16: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("child_process"); L17: const path = require("path"); ... L19: const os = require("os"); L20: const http = require("http"); L21: const https = require("https"); ... L200: function installIDESkills(verbose = true) { L201: const homeDir = os.homedir(); L202: const cwd = process.cwd(); ... L299: try { L300: const isWindows = process.platform === "win32"; L301: const cmd = isWindows ? "where" : "which";

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

bin/inboost-proxy.jsView on unpkg · L15