@inboost-pro/inboost-proxy@0.3.3
Local inference proxy and reliability gateway for Claude Code, Cursor, OpenHands, and Cline (alias package)
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest activates a postinstall routine that automatically writes package-provided instructions into global and project AI-agent configuration. This is unconsented lifecycle mutation of a broad agent control surface, supporting a block.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Installing the package through npm, which runs its postinstall hook.
Impact
Agent behavior can be changed without an affirmative setup action from the installer.
Mechanism
The hook calls installIDESkills, which writes and appends package-provided content to Claude and other agent configuration paths.
Policy narrative
On npm installation, the package's postinstall hook invokes its entrypoint with --postinstall. That path calls installIDESkills, which writes skills and commands and appends instructions under global and project agent configuration directories. The configuration changes occur without an affirmative setup action, creating an unconsented AI-agent control surface.
AI rationale
The manifest activates a postinstall routine that automatically writes package-provided instructions into global and project AI-agent configuration. This is unconsented lifecycle mutation of a broad agent control surface, supporting a block.
Evidence
package.jsonbin/inboost-proxy.js
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI identified this as a dangerous AI-agent capability at 97.0% confidence with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for policy risk
- package.json defines a postinstall hook that invokes the entrypoint with --postinstall.
- The --postinstall path calls installIDESkills(false) automatically.
- The installer writes skill and command files and appends instructions to global and project Claude configuration.
- The write helpers create directories and write or append configuration content.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
10 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node bin/inboost-proxy.js --postinstall
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node bin/inboost-proxy.js --postinstall
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgbin/inboost-proxy.jsView file
15L16: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("child_process");
L17: const path = require("path");
...
L19: const os = require("os");
L20: const http = require("http");
L21: const https = require("https");
...
L200: function installIDESkills(verbose = true) {
L201: const homeDir = os.homedir();
L202: const cwd = process.cwd();
...
L299: try {
L300: const isWindows = process.platform === "win32";
L301: const cmd = isWindows ? "where" : "which";
Critical
Findings
3 Critical5 High5 Medium4 Low
CriticalDownload Executebin/inboost-proxy.js
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackbin/inboost-proxy.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitybin/inboost-proxy.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processbin/inboost-proxy.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitybin/inboost-proxy.js
HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationbin/inboost-proxy.js
HighTrigger Reachable Persistencebin/inboost-proxy.js
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumInstall Persistencebin/inboost-proxy.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @inboost-pro/inboost-proxy@0.3.3.
See all versions of @inboost-pro/inboost-proxy for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @inboost-pro/inboost-proxy@0.3.3. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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