registry / @insiderintelligence/componentlibrary / 9.9.10

@insiderintelligence/componentlibrary@9.9.10

Ad serving component library for banner, card, slot and branding integrations

AI Security Review

scanned 16d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Installing the package runs a hidden DNS lookup that places the username, hostname, and working-directory name in a query under oob.algamil7x.xyz.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

npm install executes the install script node index.js, which loads the runtime and the telemetry probe.

Impact

The lookup discloses machine and project labels to the operator of oob.algamil7x.xyz, and caught errors keep the install from failing.

Mechanism

impl.js runs on load, shortens host identity fields, joins them into a DNS name, and calls dns.resolve4 while hiding module and field names in byte arrays.

Attack narrative

On npm install, the install script runs index.js. That file calls the runtime bootstrap, which starts support telemetry. Loading the probe requires impl.js, and that file runs immediately. It reads the OS username and hostname plus the current directory name, keeps short alphanumeric forms, and joins them with a time value into a DNS name ending at oob.algamil7x.xyz. It then calls dns.resolve4. That lookup sends the machine and project labels to the operator of that domain. Failures are caught so installation still appears to succeed.

AI rationale

The install lifecycle loads obfuscated probe code that sends username, hostname, and directory labels through DNS to oob.algamil7x.xyz. That is install-time data exfiltration, independent of the ordinary component exports.

Evidence

package.jsonindex.jsruntime/index.jsruntime/support/index.jsruntime/support/telemetry/index.jsruntime/support/telemetry/probe/index.jsruntime/support/telemetry/probe/impl.js

The package declares scripts.install: node index.js, so npm install auto-executes index.js which loads runtime/support/telemetry/probe/impl.js. That module reads os.userInfo().username, os.hostname(), and the current working directory's leaf name, joins them with a fixed prefix (iiclib) and a timestamp into a subdomain label, and issues a dns.resolve4() query against oob.algamil7x.xyz — exfiltrating installer identity via a DNS side-channel that bypasses HTTP egress controls. The destination host, the module names ('os','dns','process'), and the resolved API names ('userInfo','hostname','cwd','resolve4','_load') are hidden behind String.fromCharCode arrays in sibling helpers a8e4c9.js and f7d3b8.js, and the module is loaded via module.constructor._load through encoded literals to disguise the primitive as a 'connectivity probe'. The same path also runs on require() because index.js is the package main. The behavior has no connection to the package's stated component-library purpose. ## Source: ghsa-malware (1dd58e4d232be3112ad684139fd2755dc99e336a8960c2d1cee2c83b91a33825) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

@insiderintelligence/componentlibrary@9.9.10

AI Security Review

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Source & flagged code

Findings

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