AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo confirmed malicious attack surface was established. Risky primitives are tied to explicit deployment/demo CLI commands, not install-time or import-time execution.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/demo.js can run docker/git/ssh commands and Cloudflare API calls for demo up/down/clear.
- dist/init/init.js runs git init and pnpm install when the user invokes intentic init.
- dist/resolve/resolve.js dynamically imports the user-specified deploy config.
- package.json has no npm lifecycle hooks; bin is only ./dist/cli.js.
- dist/cli.js only dispatches user-invoked Stricli commands; no install-time behavior found.
- Network access is package-aligned deployment functionality using Cloudflare/Forgejo/Discord webhook inputs.
- No writes to Claude/Codex/Cursor/MCP or other AI-agent control surfaces were found.
- Secret handling stores generated credentials locally/host-side and uses env tokens for requested deploy operations.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView on unpkg · L1Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/resolve/resolve.jsView on unpkg · L6A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29