AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo confirmed malicious attack surface was established. Risky primitives are tied to explicit deployment/demo CLI commands and match the package's documented infrastructure-provisioning purpose.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/init/init.js runs git/pnpm and writes scaffolded project files when user invokes `intentic init`.
- dist/demo.js combines Docker/git/SSH execution, Cloudflare API calls, and local secret/state writes for an explicit demo command.
- dist/resolve/resolve.js dynamically imports the user-supplied config path.
- package.json has no install/preinstall/postinstall lifecycle hooks; executable is only bin `intentic`.
- dist/cli.js only dispatches CLI arguments through @stricli/core; no import-time payload beyond command setup.
- Network use is package-aligned infrastructure functionality: Cloudflare, Forgejo, Discord webhook from resolved user config, and local demo services.
- No evidence of credential harvesting or exfiltration beyond reading documented user env secrets for deployment actions.
- No AI-agent control-surface writes, persistence hooks, shell startup changes, or foreign agent configuration mutation found.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView on unpkg · L1Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/resolve/resolve.jsView on unpkg · L6A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29