registry  /  @intentic/cli  /  1.60.1

@intentic/cli@1.60.1

AI Security Review

scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface was established. Risky primitives are tied to explicit deployment/demo CLI commands and match the package's documented infrastructure-provisioning purpose.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
User-invoked CLI commands such as `intentic init`, `resolve`, `apply`, `adopt`, or demo modes.
Impact
Can create local project files, run git/pnpm/docker/ssh, and call configured provider APIs during requested deployment workflows.
Mechanism
User-directed infrastructure scaffolding and reconciliation
Rationale
Static inspection shows an infrastructure deployment CLI with powerful but documented, user-invoked behavior and no install-time execution or covert persistence/exfiltration. Scanner findings are explained by expected git/pnpm/docker/ssh/provider operations in init/apply/demo flows.
Evidence
package.jsondist/cli.jsdist/app.jsdist/init/init.jsdist/init/scaffold-app.jsdist/resolve/resolve.jsdist/apply/apply.command.jsdist/demo.jsREADME.mdintent/deploy.config.tsintent/package.jsonintent/tsconfig.jsonintent/.gitignoredesired-state/.gitignoreapp/package.jsonapp/server.jsapp/Dockerfiledesired-state/.envdesired-state/.secrets.jsondesired-state/status.jsondesired-state/access.md
Network endpoints6
api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/.../cfd_tunnel/.../connectionsgit.${zone}deploy.${zone}app.${zone}127.0.0.1:${forgejoPort}127.0.0.1:${komodoPort}

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • dist/init/init.js runs git/pnpm and writes scaffolded project files when user invokes `intentic init`.
  • dist/demo.js combines Docker/git/SSH execution, Cloudflare API calls, and local secret/state writes for an explicit demo command.
  • dist/resolve/resolve.js dynamically imports the user-supplied config path.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no install/preinstall/postinstall lifecycle hooks; executable is only bin `intentic`.
  • dist/cli.js only dispatches CLI arguments through @stricli/core; no import-time payload beyond command setup.
  • Network use is package-aligned infrastructure functionality: Cloudflare, Forgejo, Discord webhook from resolved user config, and local demo services.
  • No evidence of credential harvesting or exfiltration beyond reading documented user env secrets for deployment actions.
  • No AI-agent control-surface writes, persistence hooks, shell startup changes, or foreign agent configuration mutation found.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 37 file(s), 88.7 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.cloudflare.com

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source
dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView file
1import { execFile } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView on unpkg · L1
dist/resolve/resolve.jsView file
6export const loadIntent = async (configPath) => { L7: const loaded = (await import(pathToFileURL(resolve(configPath)).href)); L8: if (loaded.intent === undefined) {
Medium
Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/resolve/resolve.jsView on unpkg · L6
dist/demo.jsView file
29const komodoPort = config.demo.komodoPort; L30: const GIT_URL = `https://git.${zone}`; L31: const KOMODO_URL = `https://deploy.${zone}`; ... L38: const cliEnv = { L39: ...process.env, L40: DEMO_DOH_ZONE: zone, ... L43: const run = (command, args, env = process.env) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L44: const child = spawn(command, args, { cwd: repoRoot, env, stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"] }); L45: child.on("error", reject);
High
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29
29const komodoPort = config.demo.komodoPort; L30: const GIT_URL = `https://git.${zone}`; L31: const KOMODO_URL = `https://deploy.${zone}`; ... L33: const log = (message) => { L34: process.stdout.write(`${message}\n`); L35: }; ... L43: const run = (command, args, env = process.env) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L44: const child = spawn(command, args, { cwd: repoRoot, env, stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"] }); L45: child.on("error", reject);
High
Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29

Findings

4 High3 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processdist/init/scaffold-app.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/demo.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/demo.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/resolve/resolve.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings