AI Security Review
scanned 1h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo confirmed malicious attack surface. Sensitive operations are user-invoked CLI deployment/scaffold/demo features and use user-supplied config, env tokens, or generated secrets.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/init/init.js runs git init and pnpm install, but only after explicit intentic init.
- dist/demo.js runs docker/git/SSH actions and Cloudflare cleanup, but only via explicit demo up/down/clear mode.
- dist/resolve/resolve.js dynamically imports user config and reads Cloudflare token from env.
- dist/adopt/adopt.command.js pushes collected deployment secrets to the user-configured Forgejo domain.
- package.json has no preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle hooks.
- bin dist/cli.js only dispatches Stricli commands; no import-time mutation or network call found.
- Network calls are aligned with deployment features: Cloudflare, Forgejo, Discord webhook from artifact.
- No evidence of credential harvesting to hardcoded unrelated endpoints.
- No AI-agent control-surface writes or persistence outside declared deployment/scaffold flows found.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView on unpkg · L1Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/resolve/resolve.jsView on unpkg · L6A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29