registry  /  @intentic/cli  /  1.61.0

@intentic/cli@1.61.0

AI Security Review

scanned 1h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface. Sensitive operations are user-invoked CLI deployment/scaffold/demo features and use user-supplied config, env tokens, or generated secrets.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Explicit CLI commands such as init, resolve, apply, adopt, sandbox-tunnel, host-ssh-tunnel, or demo modes.
Impact
Can create local project files, write generated secrets, run deployment commands, and update user-controlled infrastructure when invoked.
Mechanism
Deployment automation with git/docker/SSH/Cloudflare/Forgejo operations
Rationale
Static inspection found powerful deployment primitives, but they are exposed as explicit CLI commands for this package's stated purpose and are not triggered at install/import time. No hidden exfiltration, destructive payload, stealth persistence, or unconsented AI-agent control mutation was found.
Evidence
package.jsondist/cli.jsdist/app.jsdist/init/init.jsdist/init/scaffold-app.jsdist/resolve/resolve.jsdist/resolve/resolve.command.jsdist/apply/apply.command.jsdist/adopt/adopt.command.jsdist/demo.jsdist/sandbox-tunnel/sandbox-tunnel.jsdist/host-ssh-tunnel/host-ssh-tunnel.jsintent/deploy.config.tsintent/package.jsonintent/tsconfig.jsonintent/.gitignoredesired-state/.gitignoredesired-state/desired-state.jsondesired-state/.secrets.jsondesired-state/.env.exampledesired-state/status.jsondesired-state/access.mdapp/package.jsonapp/server.jsapp/Dockerfileapp/.gitignore
Network endpoints3
api.cloudflare.com/client/v4<user-configured-forgejo-domain><artifact-provided-discord-webhook>

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • dist/init/init.js runs git init and pnpm install, but only after explicit intentic init.
  • dist/demo.js runs docker/git/SSH actions and Cloudflare cleanup, but only via explicit demo up/down/clear mode.
  • dist/resolve/resolve.js dynamically imports user config and reads Cloudflare token from env.
  • dist/adopt/adopt.command.js pushes collected deployment secrets to the user-configured Forgejo domain.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle hooks.
  • bin dist/cli.js only dispatches Stricli commands; no import-time mutation or network call found.
  • Network calls are aligned with deployment features: Cloudflare, Forgejo, Discord webhook from artifact.
  • No evidence of credential harvesting to hardcoded unrelated endpoints.
  • No AI-agent control-surface writes or persistence outside declared deployment/scaffold flows found.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 37 file(s), 88.8 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.cloudflare.com

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source
dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView file
1import { execFile } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView on unpkg · L1
dist/resolve/resolve.jsView file
6export const loadIntent = async (configPath) => { L7: const loaded = (await import(pathToFileURL(resolve(configPath)).href)); L8: if (loaded.intent === undefined) {
Medium
Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/resolve/resolve.jsView on unpkg · L6
dist/demo.jsView file
29const komodoPort = config.demo.komodoPort; L30: const GIT_URL = `https://git.${zone}`; L31: const KOMODO_URL = `https://deploy.${zone}`; ... L38: const cliEnv = { L39: ...process.env, L40: DEMO_DOH_ZONE: zone, ... L43: const run = (command, args, env = process.env) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L44: const child = spawn(command, args, { cwd: repoRoot, env, stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"] }); L45: child.on("error", reject);
High
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29
29const komodoPort = config.demo.komodoPort; L30: const GIT_URL = `https://git.${zone}`; L31: const KOMODO_URL = `https://deploy.${zone}`; ... L33: const log = (message) => { L34: process.stdout.write(`${message}\n`); L35: }; ... L43: const run = (command, args, env = process.env) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L44: const child = spawn(command, args, { cwd: repoRoot, env, stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"] }); L45: child.on("error", reject);
High
Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29

Findings

4 High3 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processdist/init/scaffold-app.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/demo.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/demo.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/resolve/resolve.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings