registry  /  @intentic/cli  /  1.62.0

@intentic/cli@1.62.0

AI Security Review

scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious install-time or import-time attack surface. Risky primitives are tied to explicit deployment/demo CLI commands and package-aligned infrastructure automation.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
User runs intentic CLI commands such as init, resolve, apply, adopt, or demo
Impact
Can create project files, run git/pnpm/docker/ssh, update Cloudflare/Forgejo resources, and write local desired-state secrets when explicitly invoked
Mechanism
User-invoked deployment scaffolding and reconciliation
Rationale
Static inspection shows a deployment CLI with powerful but explicit user-invoked commands, and no lifecycle hooks, hidden persistence, credential harvesting, exfiltration, or foreign AI-agent control-surface mutation. Scanner hits map to expected deploy/demo functionality rather than concrete malicious behavior.
Evidence
package.jsondist/cli.jsdist/app.jsdist/init/init.jsdist/init/scaffold-app.jsdist/resolve/resolve.jsdist/apply/apply.command.jsdist/demo.jsdist/adopt/adopt.jsdist/adopt/adopt.command.jsintent/deploy.config.tsintent/package.jsonintent/tsconfig.jsonintent/.gitignoredesired-state/.gitignoredesired-state/desired-state.jsondesired-state/.env.exampledesired-state/.secrets.jsondesired-state/access.mdapp/package.jsonapp/server.jsapp/Dockerfileapp/.gitignore.demo/state.json
Network endpoints5
api.cloudflare.com/client/v4git.<zone>deploy.<zone>127.0.0.1:<forgejoPort>127.0.0.1:<komodoPort>

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • dist/init/init.js user-invoked init runs git/pnpm and writes scaffold files
  • dist/demo.js user-invoked demo manages Docker, SSH, Cloudflare demo DNS/tunnel
Evidence against
  • package.json has no npm lifecycle hooks; bin only maps intentic to dist/cli.js
  • dist/app.js registers explicit CLI commands; no import-time execution beyond CLI dispatch
  • dist/resolve/resolve.js dynamically imports user config path for intended deploy resolution
  • dist/apply/apply.command.js posts only to configured Discord webhook output and uses env secrets for deployment
  • rg found no Claude/Codex/Cursor/MCP control-surface writes
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 37 file(s), 88.8 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.cloudflare.com

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source
dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView file
1import { execFile } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView on unpkg · L1
dist/resolve/resolve.jsView file
6export const loadIntent = async (configPath) => { L7: const loaded = (await import(pathToFileURL(resolve(configPath)).href)); L8: if (loaded.intent === undefined) {
Medium
Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/resolve/resolve.jsView on unpkg · L6
dist/demo.jsView file
29const komodoPort = config.demo.komodoPort; L30: const GIT_URL = `https://git.${zone}`; L31: const KOMODO_URL = `https://deploy.${zone}`; ... L38: const cliEnv = { L39: ...process.env, L40: DEMO_DOH_ZONE: zone, ... L43: const run = (command, args, env = process.env) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L44: const child = spawn(command, args, { cwd: repoRoot, env, stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"] }); L45: child.on("error", reject);
High
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29
29const komodoPort = config.demo.komodoPort; L30: const GIT_URL = `https://git.${zone}`; L31: const KOMODO_URL = `https://deploy.${zone}`; ... L33: const log = (message) => { L34: process.stdout.write(`${message}\n`); L35: }; ... L43: const run = (command, args, env = process.env) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L44: const child = spawn(command, args, { cwd: repoRoot, env, stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"] }); L45: child.on("error", reject);
High
Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29

Findings

4 High3 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processdist/init/scaffold-app.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/demo.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/demo.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/resolve/resolve.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings