AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo confirmed malicious attack surface: risky primitives are tied to explicit deployment, tunnel, scaffold, and demo commands. There is no install-time execution or hidden mutation of foreign control surfaces.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- User-invoked commands can execute git/pnpm/docker and SSH operations for scaffolding/demo/deploy workflows.
- User-invoked Cloudflare tunnel/DNS actions use API tokens from env or desired-state .env.
- package.json has no npm lifecycle hooks; only bin is dist/cli.js.
- dist/cli.js only dispatches stricli commands; no install/import-time side effects found.
- dist/init/init.js scaffolds intent/ desired-state/ app/ and runs pnpm install only when user runs intentic init.
- dist/resolve/resolve.js dynamically imports the user-supplied deploy config and calls Cloudflare zone listing for deployment resolution.
- dist/demo.js docker/SSH/fetch behavior is demo-mode orchestration, not lifecycle-triggered exfiltration.
- No AI-agent control-surface writes, persistence hooks, credential harvesting, or hidden remote code loading found.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView on unpkg · L1Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/resolve/resolve.jsView on unpkg · L6A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29