registry  /  @intentic/cli  /  1.63.0

@intentic/cli@1.63.0

AI Security Review

scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface: risky primitives are tied to explicit deployment, tunnel, scaffold, and demo commands. There is no install-time execution or hidden mutation of foreign control surfaces.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
Explicit CLI command such as intentic init, resolve, apply, sandbox-tunnel, host-ssh-tunnel, or direct demo invocation.
Impact
Creates project files, resolves desired-state, manages Cloudflare/SSH/Docker resources according to user configuration.
Mechanism
User-invoked deployment orchestration and project scaffolding.
Rationale
Static source inspection shows a deployment CLI with explicit commands for scaffolding, resolving, applying, tunnels, and demos; the scanner hits are package-aligned user-invoked behavior. No lifecycle hook, covert exfiltration, persistence, or AI-agent control hijack was found.
Evidence
package.jsondist/cli.jsdist/app.jsdist/init/init.jsdist/init/scaffold-app.jsdist/resolve/resolve.jsdist/apply/apply.command.jsdist/demo.jsdist/sandbox-tunnel/sandbox-tunnel.jsdist/host-ssh-tunnel/host-ssh-tunnel.jsintent/deploy.config.tsintent/package.jsonintent/tsconfig.jsondesired-state/desired-state.jsondesired-state/.env.exampledesired-state/.secrets.jsondesired-state/.last-applied.jsondesired-state/status.jsondesired-state/access.mdapp/package.jsonapp/server.jsapp/Dockerfile.demo/state.json/opt/intentic/secrets.json
Network endpoints3
api.cloudflare.com/client/v4github.com/actions/checkoutregistry.npmjs.org/

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • User-invoked commands can execute git/pnpm/docker and SSH operations for scaffolding/demo/deploy workflows.
  • User-invoked Cloudflare tunnel/DNS actions use API tokens from env or desired-state .env.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no npm lifecycle hooks; only bin is dist/cli.js.
  • dist/cli.js only dispatches stricli commands; no install/import-time side effects found.
  • dist/init/init.js scaffolds intent/ desired-state/ app/ and runs pnpm install only when user runs intentic init.
  • dist/resolve/resolve.js dynamically imports the user-supplied deploy config and calls Cloudflare zone listing for deployment resolution.
  • dist/demo.js docker/SSH/fetch behavior is demo-mode orchestration, not lifecycle-triggered exfiltration.
  • No AI-agent control-surface writes, persistence hooks, credential harvesting, or hidden remote code loading found.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 37 file(s), 88.8 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.cloudflare.com

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source
dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView file
1import { execFile } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView on unpkg · L1
dist/resolve/resolve.jsView file
6export const loadIntent = async (configPath) => { L7: const loaded = (await import(pathToFileURL(resolve(configPath)).href)); L8: if (loaded.intent === undefined) {
Medium
Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/resolve/resolve.jsView on unpkg · L6
dist/demo.jsView file
29const komodoPort = config.demo.komodoPort; L30: const GIT_URL = `https://git.${zone}`; L31: const KOMODO_URL = `https://deploy.${zone}`; ... L38: const cliEnv = { L39: ...process.env, L40: DEMO_DOH_ZONE: zone, ... L43: const run = (command, args, env = process.env) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L44: const child = spawn(command, args, { cwd: repoRoot, env, stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"] }); L45: child.on("error", reject);
High
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29
29const komodoPort = config.demo.komodoPort; L30: const GIT_URL = `https://git.${zone}`; L31: const KOMODO_URL = `https://deploy.${zone}`; ... L33: const log = (message) => { L34: process.stdout.write(`${message}\n`); L35: }; ... L43: const run = (command, args, env = process.env) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L44: const child = spawn(command, args, { cwd: repoRoot, env, stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"] }); L45: child.on("error", reject);
High
Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29

Findings

4 High3 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processdist/init/scaffold-app.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/demo.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/demo.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/resolve/resolve.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings