registry  /  @intentic/cli  /  1.69.0

@intentic/cli@1.69.0

AI Security Review

scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface. The package is a deployment CLI with user-invoked commands that scaffold repos, read local env/secrets, call provider APIs, and reconcile infrastructure.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
User runs intentic CLI commands such as init, resolve, apply, adopt, or demo
Impact
Can modify project intent/desired-state/app files and provision remote infrastructure only through invoked CLI workflows and user-supplied configs/secrets.
Mechanism
user-directed deployment automation
Rationale
Static inspection shows a normal infrastructure/deployment CLI: suspicious primitives are expected for scaffolding, git operations, provider APIs, and demo automation, and they are not install-time or hidden. No concrete malicious behavior or unconsented lifecycle mutation was found.
Evidence
package.jsondist/cli.jsdist/app.jsdist/init/init.jsdist/init/scaffold-app.jsdist/resolve/resolve.jsdist/apply/apply.command.jsdist/adopt/adopt.command.jsdist/demo.jsREADME.mdintent/deploy.config.tsintent/package.jsonintent/tsconfig.jsonintent/.gitignoredesired-state/.gitignoredesired-state/desired-state.jsondesired-state/.env.exampledesired-state/.secrets.jsondesired-state/status.jsondesired-state/access.mdapp/package.jsonapp/server.jsapp/Dockerfileapp/.gitignore
Network endpoints6
api.cloudflare.com/client/v4git.${zone}deploy.${zone}${domain}127.0.0.1:${forgejoPort}127.0.0.1:${komodoPort}

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • dist/apply/apply.command.js can POST to a reconcileWebhook URL from the user-provided artifact
  • dist/resolve/resolve.js dynamically imports the user-selected deploy config
  • dist/init/init.js and dist/demo.js invoke git/pnpm/docker/ssh workflows when CLI commands are run
Evidence against
  • package.json has no npm lifecycle hooks; bin only maps intentic to dist/cli.js
  • dist/cli.js only starts the Stricli CLI and imports dist/app.js
  • Child process and file writes are tied to documented user-invoked init/adopt/apply/demo commands
  • Network calls are package-aligned deployment/provider operations to Cloudflare, Forgejo, local services, or configured webhooks
  • No evidence of credential harvesting, install-time execution, persistence, AI-agent control-surface writes, or obfuscated staged payloads
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 37 file(s), 88.8 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.cloudflare.com

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source
dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView file
1import { execFile } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView on unpkg · L1
dist/resolve/resolve.jsView file
6export const loadIntent = async (configPath) => { L7: const loaded = (await import(pathToFileURL(resolve(configPath)).href)); L8: if (loaded.intent === undefined) {
Medium
Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/resolve/resolve.jsView on unpkg · L6
dist/demo.jsView file
29const komodoPort = config.demo.komodoPort; L30: const GIT_URL = `https://git.${zone}`; L31: const KOMODO_URL = `https://deploy.${zone}`; ... L38: const cliEnv = { L39: ...process.env, L40: DEMO_DOH_ZONE: zone, ... L43: const run = (command, args, env = process.env) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L44: const child = spawn(command, args, { cwd: repoRoot, env, stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"] }); L45: child.on("error", reject);
High
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29
29const komodoPort = config.demo.komodoPort; L30: const GIT_URL = `https://git.${zone}`; L31: const KOMODO_URL = `https://deploy.${zone}`; ... L33: const log = (message) => { L34: process.stdout.write(`${message}\n`); L35: }; ... L43: const run = (command, args, env = process.env) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L44: const child = spawn(command, args, { cwd: repoRoot, env, stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"] }); L45: child.on("error", reject);
High
Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29

Findings

4 High3 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processdist/init/scaffold-app.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/demo.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/demo.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/resolve/resolve.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings