AI Security Review
scanned 22h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo confirmed malicious attack surface was established. Risky primitives are tied to explicit deployment/demo CLI commands and user-provided infrastructure configuration, not install-time execution.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- dist/resolve/resolve.js dynamically imports user-supplied deploy config via pathToFileURL
- dist/init/init.js and dist/init/scaffold-app.js run git/pnpm during explicit init scaffolding
- dist/demo.js combines Docker/git/SSH execution with Cloudflare API calls and writes demo state/secrets
- dist/apply/apply.command.js can POST status to a user-provided discord reconcileWebhook
- package.json has no npm lifecycle hooks; only bin is dist/cli.js
- dist/cli.js only dispatches Stricli commands, no install/import-time behavior
- README.md documents deployment CLI behavior, .env/.secrets.json handling, and user-invoked commands
- Network access is deployment-aligned: Cloudflare, Forgejo, SSH, and optional webhook from artifacts/config
- No writes to foreign AI-agent control surfaces, shell startup files, VCS hooks, or OS persistence found
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage source references child process execution.
dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView on unpkg · L1Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/resolve/resolve.jsView on unpkg · L6A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29