registry / @intentic/cli / 1.82.0

@intentic/cli@1.82.0

AI Security Review

scanned 17h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface; risky primitives are user-invoked deployment/demo CLI behavior. The package can create project scaffolds, run Docker/git, and call Cloudflare/Forgejo APIs when corresponding commands are run.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

explicit CLI/demo command invocation

Impact

user-authorized project/demo files, containers, and Cloudflare demo DNS/tunnel changes

Mechanism

deployment scaffolding and demo orchestration

Rationale

Static inspection shows a deployment-oriented CLI with powerful but explicit user-invoked workflows and no lifecycle execution, covert exfiltration, persistence, or foreign AI-agent control-surface mutation. Scanner signals are explained by legitimate demo/scaffold/resolve functionality.

Evidence

package.jsondist/cli.jsdist/demo.jsdist/init/scaffold-app.jsdist/resolve/resolve.jsintent/deploy.config.tsdesired-state/desired-state.jsondesired-state/.env.demo/state.json

Network endpoints6

api.cloudflare.com/client/v4git.${zone}deploy.${zone}app.${zone}127.0.0.1:${forgejoPort}127.0.0.1:${komodoPort}

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 88.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

dist/demo.js can run Docker, SSH, Forgejo and Cloudflare operations, including deleting demo tunnels/DNS on explicit clear.
dist/resolve/resolve.js dynamically imports a user config path and reads a Cloudflare token from env for zone discovery.
dist/init/scaffold-app.js shells out to git clone/init and writes starter app files when init scaffolding is invoked.

Evidence against

package.json has no install/preinstall/postinstall lifecycle hooks; activation is via bin intentic or direct demo script only.
dist/cli.js only dispatches @stricli CLI commands, with no import-time side effects beyond running requested CLI.
Network endpoints are product-aligned Cloudflare/demo URLs and localhost services, not covert exfiltration endpoints.
No code found writing AI-agent control surfaces, shell startup files, VCS hooks, or persistence outside user-requested project/demo paths.
Command execution is tied to explicit scaffold/demo workflows and fixed tools like git/docker, not obfuscated payload execution.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 36 file(s), 90.1 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.cloudflare.com

Source & flagged code

4 flagged

dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1import { execFile } from "node:child_process";

2import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView on unpkg · L1

3import { join } from "node:path";

4import { promisify } from "node:util";

5import { renderTemplate } from "../lib/templates.js";

6const exec = promisify(execFile);

7const APP_GITIGNORE = "node_modules/\n";

8const STARTER_APP_PACKAGE = `${JSON.stringify({

9 name: "app",

10 version: "0.0.0",

11 private: true,

12 type: "module",

13 scripts: { dev: "node server.js", start: "node server.js" },

14}, undefined, 4)}\n`;

15export const scaffoldApp = async (appDir, appRepo) => {

16 if (appRepo !== undefined) {

17 await exec("git", ["clone", "-q", appRepo, appDir]);

18 return;

19 }

20 await mkdir(appDir, { recursive: true });

21 await exec("git", ["init", "-q", appDir]);

dist/resolve/resolve.jsView file

Lines 1-26javascript

1import { resolve } from "node:path";

2import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";

3import { cloudflareApi } from "@intentic/providers";

4import { collectDomains, selectZone } from "@intentic/state-resolver";

5import { loadEnvFile } from "../lib/artifact.js";

dist/demo.jsView file

Lines 9-49javascript

9import { loadConfig } from "./env.config.js";

10import { renderTemplate } from "./lib/templates.js";

11import { readGeneratedSecrets } from "./secrets/generated-secrets.js";

12const { utils } = createRequire(import.meta.url)("ssh2");

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source

dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView file

1import { execFile } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView on unpkg · L1

dist/resolve/resolve.jsView file

6export const loadIntent = async (configPath) => { L7: const loaded = (await import(pathToFileURL(resolve(configPath)).href)); L8: if (loaded.intent === undefined) {

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/resolve/resolve.jsView on unpkg · L6

dist/demo.jsView file

29const komodoPort = config.demo.komodoPort; L30: const GIT_URL = `https://git.${zone}`; L31: const KOMODO_URL = `https://deploy.${zone}`; ... L38: const cliEnv = { L39: ...process.env, L40: DEMO_DOH_ZONE: zone, ... L43: const run = (command, args, env = process.env) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L44: const child = spawn(command, args, { cwd: repoRoot, env, stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"] }); L45: child.on("error", reject);

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29

29const komodoPort = config.demo.komodoPort; L30: const GIT_URL = `https://git.${zone}`; L31: const KOMODO_URL = `https://deploy.${zone}`; ... L33: const log = (message) => { L34: process.stdout.write(`${message}\n`); L35: }; ... L43: const run = (command, args, env = process.env) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L44: const child = spawn(command, args, { cwd: repoRoot, env, stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"] }); L45: child.on("error", reject);

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29

Findings

4 High3 Medium4 Low

HighChild Processdist/init/scaffold-app.js

HighShell

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/demo.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/demo.js

MediumDynamic Requiredist/resolve/resolve.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Source & flagged code

4 flagged

dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1import { execFile } from "node:child_process";

2import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView on unpkg · L1

3import { join } from "node:path";

4import { promisify } from "node:util";

5import { renderTemplate } from "../lib/templates.js";

6const exec = promisify(execFile);

7const APP_GITIGNORE = "node_modules/\n";

8const STARTER_APP_PACKAGE = `${JSON.stringify({

9 name: "app",

10 version: "0.0.0",

11 private: true,

12 type: "module",

13 scripts: { dev: "node server.js", start: "node server.js" },

14}, undefined, 4)}\n`;

15export const scaffoldApp = async (appDir, appRepo) => {

16 if (appRepo !== undefined) {

17 await exec("git", ["clone", "-q", appRepo, appDir]);

18 return;

19 }

20 await mkdir(appDir, { recursive: true });

21 await exec("git", ["init", "-q", appDir]);

dist/resolve/resolve.jsView file

Lines 1-26javascript

1import { resolve } from "node:path";

2import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";

3import { cloudflareApi } from "@intentic/providers";

4import { collectDomains, selectZone } from "@intentic/state-resolver";

5import { loadEnvFile } from "../lib/artifact.js";

dist/demo.jsView file

Lines 9-49javascript

9import { loadConfig } from "./env.config.js";

10import { renderTemplate } from "./lib/templates.js";

11import { readGeneratedSecrets } from "./secrets/generated-secrets.js";

12const { utils } = createRequire(import.meta.url)("ssh2");