registry  /  @intentic/cli  /  1.91.0

@intentic/cli@1.91.0

AI Security Review

scanned 2h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface. Risky primitives are tied to explicit CLI deployment/demo/adopt commands and package-aligned infrastructure automation, not install-time or hidden execution.

Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
User runs intentic commands such as init, resolve, apply, adopt, sandbox-tunnel, host-ssh-tunnel, or demo directly.
Impact
Can create/update deployment infrastructure and store generated credentials when explicitly invoked; no stealth credential harvesting or exfiltration found.
Mechanism
User-invoked deployment automation with git, SSH, Docker, Cloudflare, Forgejo, and local secret files.
Rationale
Static inspection found no lifecycle hooks, hidden import-time behavior, credential theft, or unconsented AI-agent/control-surface mutation. The suspicious scanner signals are explained by explicit deployment CLI features and a non-bin demo script.
Evidence
package.jsondist/cli.jsdist/app.jsdist/index.jsdist/demo.jsdist/init/init.jsdist/init/scaffold-app.jsdist/resolve/resolve.jsdist/apply/apply.command.jsdist/adopt/adopt.jsdist/secrets/secret-store.jsREADME.mdintent/desired-state/app/desired-state/.envdesired-state/.secrets.jsondesired-state/status.jsondesired-state/access.mddesired-state/.last-applied.json/opt/intentic/secrets.json
Network endpoints4
api.cloudflare.com/client/v4/accounts/${cfZone.accountId}/cfd_tunnel/${tunnel.id}/connections${domain}127.0.0.1:${forgejoPort}127.0.0.1:${komodoPort}

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 90.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • dist/demo.js combines Docker/git/SSH execution, Cloudflare API calls, and local state writes, but is not package bin or lifecycle.
  • dist/resolve/resolve.js dynamically imports user-specified deploy config and reads Cloudflare token from env when resolve is invoked.
  • dist/apply/apply.command.js can POST a reconcile summary to a user-supplied Discord webhook from artifact outputs.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no preinstall/install/postinstall lifecycle hooks; only bin is dist/cli.js.
  • dist/cli.js only dispatches Stricli commands; no import-time exfiltration or mutation observed.
  • dist/index.js exports helpers only; no network, shell, or install-time behavior.
  • Child process use in dist/init/init.js and dist/adopt/adopt.js is explicit CLI scaffolding/git workflow behavior.
  • Secret reads/writes are documented package functions: .env/.secrets.json, /opt/intentic/secrets.json over configured SSH, and Forgejo repo secrets.
  • README.md describes an intent-driven deployment CLI matching observed Cloudflare/Forgejo/Komodo/Docker behavior.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.
scanned 36 file(s), 90.1 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.cloudflare.com

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source
dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView file
1import { execFile } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
High
Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/init/scaffold-app.jsView on unpkg · L1
dist/resolve/resolve.jsView file
6export const loadIntent = async (configPath) => { L7: const loaded = (await import(pathToFileURL(resolve(configPath)).href)); L8: if (loaded.intent === undefined) {
Medium
Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

dist/resolve/resolve.jsView on unpkg · L6
dist/demo.jsView file
29const komodoPort = config.demo.komodoPort; L30: const GIT_URL = `https://git.${zone}`; L31: const KOMODO_URL = `https://deploy.${zone}`; ... L38: const cliEnv = { L39: ...process.env, L40: DEMO_DOH_ZONE: zone, ... L43: const run = (command, args, env = process.env) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L44: const child = spawn(command, args, { cwd: repoRoot, env, stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"] }); L45: child.on("error", reject);
High
Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29
29const komodoPort = config.demo.komodoPort; L30: const GIT_URL = `https://git.${zone}`; L31: const KOMODO_URL = `https://deploy.${zone}`; ... L33: const log = (message) => { L34: process.stdout.write(`${message}\n`); L35: }; ... L43: const run = (command, args, env = process.env) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L44: const child = spawn(command, args, { cwd: repoRoot, env, stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"] }); L45: child.on("error", reject);
High
Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/demo.jsView on unpkg · L29

Findings

4 High3 Medium4 Low
HighChild Processdist/init/scaffold-app.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/demo.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/demo.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/resolve/resolve.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings