--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@intutic/cli/v/1.0.9" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@intutic/cli/v/1.0.9.md" package: "@intutic/cli" report_status: "published" title: "@intutic/cli@1.0.9 npm security report" verdict: "clean" version: "1.0.9" --- # @intutic/cli@1.0.9 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Allowed — no malicious behavior detected** — No malicious behavior detected. 10 low-signal pattern(s) reviewed. - **Verdict:** Clean - **Product-default install policy:** Allow - **Firewall policy:** No policy match - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** None published - **Selected version:** 1.0.9 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The reviewed source contains powerful governance/proxy and persistence features, but they are exposed as explicit CLI functionality and align with the package description rather than unconsented install/import-time behavior. I found no credential harvesting beyond user-provided Intutic auth, no hidden endpoint, and no concrete malicious payload. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Clean - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 82.0% - **Started:** 2026-07-02T12:24:00.338Z - **Finished:** 2026-07-02T12:24:57.392Z - **Download time:** 509 ms - **Static scan time:** 316 ms - **AI review time:** 56228 ms - **Total time:** 57054 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** No confirmed malicious attack surface was established. The package is a governance CLI with user-invoked network sync, proxy routing, harness config writes, and optional daemon persistence that are disclosed by its commands and README. - **Trigger:** Explicit CLI commands such as login, init, connect, exec, or daemon install. - **Impact:** Routes supported AI tool traffic through Intutic governance infrastructure and may persist a sync daemon when requested. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, README.md, dist/cli.js, dist/commands/connect.js, dist/commands/install-daemon.js, dist/commands/init.js, dist/commands/login.js, dist/commands/exec.js, dist/lib/api.js, dist/lib/envInjector.js, dist/lib/gitHooks.js, dist/harness/codex.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-07-02T12:24:57.392Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** User-invoked control-plane sync, proxy environment injection, harness config writing, and optional service installation. - **Rationale:** The reviewed source contains powerful governance/proxy and persistence features, but they are exposed as explicit CLI functionality and align with the package description rather than unconsented install/import-time behavior. I found no credential harvesting beyond user-provided Intutic auth, no hidden endpoint, and no concrete malicious payload. - **Files touched:** ~/.intutic/credentials.json, ~/.intutic/config.json, \/.intutic/integrity.json, \/.intutic/session-context.json, \/.intutic/events/hook-events.jsonl, \/.env.intutic, ~/.codex/config.toml, \/.cursorrules, \/.windsurfrules, \/.git/hooks/post-commit, \/.git/hooks/post-checkout, ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.intutic.sync-daemon.plist, ~/.config/systemd/user/intutic-sync-daemon.service - **Network endpoints:** https://api.intutic.ai, http://localhost:3001, https://proxy.intutic.ai, http://localhost:4000, https://intutic.ai/proxy/v1.0.6, https://docs.intutic.ai ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Clean - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Recommended action:** mark\_clean - **Intent class:** Benign - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for AI clean decision:** dist/commands/connect.js can download a platform proxy binary from https://intutic.ai/proxy/v1.0.6 and spawn it during user-run connect., dist/commands/install-daemon.js installs user/system LaunchAgent or systemd units when daemon install is explicitly invoked., dist/harness/codex.js, dist/harness/cursor.js, and dist/harness/windsurf.js write AI harness proxy/rules/hook configs during sync. - **Evidence against:** package.json has no install/preinstall/postinstall lifecycle hooks; bin only exposes dist/cli.js., dist/cli.js actions dynamically import command modules only after explicit CLI subcommands., Network calls target documented Intutic control/proxy endpoints or localhost dev mode, matching README purpose., Credential storage is user-initiated login/connect and uses ~/.intutic or OS keychain helpers, not broad harvesting., No import-time execution, hidden obfuscation, destructive file operations, or unsolicited exfiltration found in inspected files. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @intutic/cli@1.0.9. - Review the evidence and your use of @intutic/cli@1.0.9 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 3. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 4. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/lib/envInjector.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L7: * Platform support: L8: * macOS: launchctl setenv L9: * Linux: ~/.bashrc append (user-level; system /etc/environment requires sudo) ... L14: */ L15: import { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; L16: import fs from 'node:fs'; ... L43: function linuxInjectUser(key, value) { L44: const rcFile = path.join(os.homedir(), '.bashrc'); L45: const marker = `# intutic-env-${key}`; ... L78: * L79: * @param proxyUrl - The Intutic proxy URL (e.g. https://proxy.acme.intutic.ai) L80: * @returns InjectionResult describing what was done ``` ### 5. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 6. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/commands/install-daemon.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L17: import * as os from 'node:os'; L18: import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; L19: import { createLogger } from '@intutic/logger'; ... L34: } L35: export function getPaths(system, isMcp, platform = process.platform) { L36: const label = isMcp ? 'ai.intutic.mcp-daemon' : 'ai.intutic.sync-daemon'; ... L38: if (platform === 'darwin') { L39: const dir = system ? '/Library/LaunchDaemons' : path.join(os.homedir(), 'Library', 'LaunchAgents'); L40: const plistPath = path.join(dir, `${label}.plist`); ... L193: try { L194: execFileSync('launchctl', ['unload', '-w', paths.targetPath], { stdio: 'ignore' }); L195: } ``` ### 7. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 8. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 9. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 10. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/commands/connect.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @intutic/cli@1.0.8 matchedIdentity = npm:QGludHV0aWMvY2xp:1.0.8 similarity = 0.920 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0 ## Package metadata - **Package:** @intutic/cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.0.9 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-07-02T12:16:29.094Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-01T20:06:37.177Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-01T18:30:37.226Z - **Known versions:** 30 - **Latest version:** 3.1.1 - **Appeal under review:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()