registry / AI-agent capability abuse / @jacebenson/jsn / 4.2.0

@jacebenson/jsn@4.2.0

A command-line interface for ServiceNow that follows the Unix philosophy: simple, composable, and scriptable.

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package has an explicit multi-agent skill installer, creating a real but user-invoked control-surface write. Source inspection found no covert exfiltration, payload execution, or lifecycle-based agent mutation.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

User runs `jsn skill install`, optionally with `--target` or `--target all`.

Impact

The command can replace or create ServiceNow skill files for selected agent tools.

Mechanism

Explicit remote AI-agent skill installation

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonsrc/cli.jssrc/commands/skill.jsskills/servicenow/SKILL.mdsrc/auth.jssrc/sdk.jsscripts/release.js

Network endpoints1

raw.githubusercontent.com/jacebenson/jsn/main/skills/servicenow/SKILL.md

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 93.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

`jsn skill install` downloads and writes a skill into selected AI-agent configuration directories.
The explicit `--target all` path can modify Codex, Claude, Cursor, Copilot, and other agent skill locations.
No install lifecycle hook was found; this capability requires a user CLI command.

Evidence against

package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall scripts.
The bundled skill contains ServiceNow CLI guidance and requires confirmation for destructive operations.
Credential and ServiceNow API use is aligned with the advertised authenticated CLI functionality.
Release shell commands are confined to an explicit developer release script.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedTelemetryUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

scripts/release.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2import { execSync } from 'child_process';

3import { readFileSync } from 'fs';

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

scripts/release.jsView on unpkg · L1

4import { fileURLToPath } from 'url';

5import { dirname, join } from 'path';

7const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));

8const pkg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(__dirname, '..', 'package.json'), 'utf8'));

10const type = process.argv[2];

11if (!type || !['patch', 'minor', 'major'].includes(type)) {

12 console.error('Usage: npm run release -- <patch|minor|major>');

13 process.exit(1);

14}

16let branch;

17try {

18 branch = execSync('git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD', { encoding: 'utf8' }).trim();

19} catch {

20 console.error('Error: Not in a git repository');

21 process.exit(1);

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @jacebenson/jsn@3.3.1 matchedPath = scripts/release.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGphY2ViZW5zb24vanNu:3.3.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/release.jsView on unpkg

src/auth.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

9import crypto from "node:crypto"; L10: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L11: import { password as passwordPrompt } from "@inquirer/prompts"; ... L20: * Whitelist approach (issue #143 findings #2/#3): first map the `://` L21: * protocol separator to `_` exactly as the Go version"s encoding does\n * (so existing keyring keys like `https_dev437538.service-now.com` keep\n * matching), then drop everything ... L22: const filename = key + ".json";

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

src/auth.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg · L9

src/commands/skill.jsView file

Lines 1-26javascript

1import fs from 'node:fs';

2import path from 'node:path';

3import os from 'node:os';

4import process from 'node:process';

scripts/pre-commit-check.shView file

•path = scripts/pre-commit-check.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 1784 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

scripts/pre-commit-check.shView on unpkg

src/commands/docs/public/vendor/marked.min.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @jacebenson/jsn@3.3.1 matchedPath = [redacted].min.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGphY2ViZW5zb24vanNu:3.3.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/commands/docs/public/vendor/marked.min.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

scripts/release.jsView file

1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: import { execSync } from 'child_process'; L3: import { readFileSync } from 'fs';

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

scripts/release.jsView on unpkg · L1

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

scripts/release.jsView on unpkg

src/auth.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

Findings

7 High4 Medium5 Low

HighChild Processscripts/release.js

HighShell

HighSame File Env Network Executionsrc/auth.js#virtual:normalized:round1

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitysrc/commands/skill.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similarityscripts/release.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/commands/docs/public/vendor/marked.min.js

HighPrevious Version Dangerous Deltasrc/commands/skill.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperscripts/pre-commit-check.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

Low

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @jacebenson/jsn@4.2.0.

See all versions of @jacebenson/jsn for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @jacebenson/jsn@4.2.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-08-26 07:38:08.195Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code