--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@jenga-ai/agent/v/3.6.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@jenga-ai/agent/v/3.6.0.md" package: "@jenga-ai/agent" report_status: "published" title: "@jenga-ai/agent@3.6.0 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "3.6.0" --- # @jenga-ai/agent@3.6.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — A dependency installation establishes recurring command execution through the consumer's Copilot lifecycle without a separate user setup command. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Install Hook Abuse - **Selected version:** 3.6.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. Installing the package automatically changes AI-agent control files in the consumer project. It configures Copilot to run package shell hooks on future prompt and session events. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 99.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-20T20:17:17.517Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-20T20:27:16.674Z - **Download time:** 510 ms - **Static scan time:** 915 ms - **AI review time:** 597730 ms - **Total time:** 599157 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Installing the package automatically changes AI-agent control files in the consumer project. It configures Copilot to run package shell hooks on future prompt and session events. - **Trigger:** npm installation runs the package postinstall lifecycle hook. - **Impact:** A dependency installation establishes recurring command execution through the consumer's Copilot lifecycle without a separate user setup command. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/postinstall.js, lib/generate-copilot-hooks.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-20T20:27:16.674Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The lifecycle hook bootstraps Copilot instructions and writes a .github hook configuration containing shell commands that target package-owned scripts. - **Attack narrative:** The package declares postinstall, so installation invokes its program automatically. That program writes Copilot instructions and a .github/hooks/jenga.json file under the consumer root. The generated configuration registers package shell scripts as commands for Copilot userPromptSubmitted and sessionEnd events, creating a persistent agent-control execution path without an interactive configuration action. - **Rationale:** The automatic postinstall mutates a foreign consumer project's Copilot control surface and installs command hooks for later agent events. This is concrete install-hook abuse under the isolation policy, even though no separate exfiltration sink was found in the inspected path. - **Files touched:** .github/copilot-instructions.md, .github/hooks/jenga.json, .agents/skills, .claude/skills ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for block:** The manifest automatically runs a postinstall program on installation., The postinstall program writes Copilot instructions into the consumer project without an interactive setup step., The postinstall program installs a Copilot hook configuration in the consumer project., That configuration registers shell commands for Copilot session-end and prompt-submission events., The hook generator creates the consumer's .github/hooks directory and overwrites its Jenga hook configuration. - **Evidence against:** No network endpoint or credential collection was identified in the inspected installation and hook path. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @jenga-ai/agent@3.6.0. - Avoid installing @jenga-ai/agent@3.6.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.js ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** mcp/training\_runner/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L15: import { join, resolve } from "path"; L16: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L17: import { load as yamlLoad } from "js-yaml"; ``` ### 5. Low: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 45.0% Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern. ### 6. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** project/app/ui/scripts/build-snapshot-html.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L46: L47: const fs = require('fs'); L48: const path = require('path'); ``` ### 7. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 8. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 9. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 10. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** project/app/ui/scripts/dashboard-open.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L16: L17: const http = require('http'); L18: const { execFile } = require('child_process'); L19: ... L22: L23: let port = parseInt(process.env.JENGA_API_PORT || '3001', 10); L24: ``` ### 11. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** scripts/postinstall.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L6: * Copies the discovery-bound dirs — `skills/` and `agents/` — into BOTH L7: * `/.claude/` (where Claude Code looks) and `/.agents/` L8: * (where non-Claude agents like Copilot / custom look, per the framework's ... L40: * Location : one manifest per destination root, inside that root — L41: * /.agents/.jenga-postinstall-manifest.json L42: * /.claude/.jenga-postinstall-manifest.json L43: * Keeping it inside the root it describes means it travels with that ... L50: * "generated_at": "", L51: * "dest_root": ".agents", L52: * "paths": ["agents/developer.md", "skills/j-do/SKILL.md"] ... L203: L204: // Discovery-bound dirs get mirr ``` ### 12. High: Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** lib/commands/init.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. const __dirname = dirname(fileurltopath(import.meta.url)); const package_root = join(__dirname, "..", ".."); async function prompt(rl, question, defaultvalue) { return new promise(resolve => { const hint = defaultvalue !== undefined ? ` (default: ${defaultvalue})` : ""; rl.question(`${question}${hint}: `, answer => { resolve(answer.trim() || string(defaultvalue ?? "")); }); }); } export async function runinit(args, projectroot = process.cwd()) { const configpath = join(projectroot, config_file); let existing = {}; if (existssync(configpath)) { try { existing = json.parse(readfilesyn ``` ### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 14. Low: Telemetry - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs. ### 15. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 16. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** hooks/on\_session\_end.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = hooks/on_session_end.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 20765 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 17. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 18. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** project/app/api/parsers/todo.js\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2 ``` ### 19. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** project/app/ui/scripts/dashboard-open.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @jenga-ai/agent@3.5.0 matchedPath = [redacted]-open.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:QGplbmdhLWFpL2FnZW50:3.5.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 20. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** project/app/ui/scripts/dashboard-start.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @jenga-ai/agent@3.5.0 matchedPath = [redacted]-start.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:QGplbmdhLWFpL2FnZW50:3.5.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 21. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** lib/commands/dashboard.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @jenga-ai/agent@3.5.0 matchedPath = lib/commands/dashboard.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGplbmdhLWFpL2FnZW50:3.5.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 22. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** mcp/training\_runner/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @jenga-ai/agent@3.5.0 matchedPath = mcp/training_runner/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGplbmdhLWFpL2FnZW50:3.5.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 23. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** project/app/api/parsers/architecture.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @jenga-ai/agent@3.5.0 matchedPath = [redacted].js matchedIdentity = npm:QGplbmdhLWFpL2FnZW50:3.5.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 24. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** skills/j-publish/scripts/npm\_stage\_pipeline.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @jenga-ai/agent@3.5.0 matchedPath = skills/j-publish/scripts/npm[redacted] matchedIdentity = npm:QGplbmdhLWFpL2FnZW50:3.5.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 25. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** skills/j-uncharted/scripts/import-source.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @jenga-ai/agent@3.5.0 matchedPath = skills/j-uncharted/scripts/import-source.sh matchedIdentity = npm:QGplbmdhLWFpL2FnZW50:3.5.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 26. High: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** project/app/ui/scripts/dashboard-open.cjs - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @jenga-ai/agent@3.2.0 matchedIdentity = npm:QGplbmdhLWFpL2FnZW50:3.2.0 similarity = 0.500 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 3 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 1 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 3 ### Published dependency entries - cors ^2.8.5 (Dependency) - express ^4.18.2 (Dependency) - gray-matter ^4.0.3 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @jenga-ai/agent - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 3.6.0 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-09-20T07:35:35.596Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-09T15:49:20.061Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-09-29T04:52:31.223Z - **Known versions:** 19 - **Latest version:** 4.1.1 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** An agentic development workflow for Claude Code, Copilot, and Codex — with a persistent Epic/Story/Task board, an isolated git worktree per task, and a separate tester agent that runs your test suite before anything is marked done. - **Author:** Samwel Munga - **Keywords:** ai, agent, agentic, workflow, framework, engineering, development, coding, context, software, kanban, board - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=14.13.1 - **Artifact files:** 315 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 3,003,565 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** Yes ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()