@karajan-family/code@4.49.4
Local multi-agent coding orchestrator with TDD, SonarQube, and code review pipeline
AI Security Review
scanned 10d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe active postinstall hook modifies Claude and Codex user configuration without prompting, creating an agent extension lifecycle risk. Its writes are scoped to this package’s own MCP entry, so the source supports a warning rather than a publish block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs scripts/postinstall.js automatically after installation.
- The postinstall path writes this package’s named MCP server into Claude and Codex user configuration without a consent prompt.
- A separate Claude hook installer requires the explicit kj-trash install --claude-code command; the init skills flow offers an interactive confirmation.
- The other inspected target locations concern config checks, watched paths, managed project files, or agent configuration discovery; they do not expand the postinstall writes.
- The postinstall setup is limited to registering the package’s own local MCP server under the karajan-mcp name; the inspected setup code shows no network transfer.
Source & flagged code
25 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
scripts/dual-publish.mjsView on unpkg · L17Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @karajan-family/code@4.49.4.
See all versions of @karajan-family/code for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @karajan-family/code@4.49.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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