@koda-sl/baker-cli@0.627.0
AI-agent-first CLI for interacting with Baker, including the Baker creative canvas.
AI Security Review
scanned 4d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiModel requests automatically include Baker company, organization, chat, and acting-user identifiers as OpenRouter attribution fields, with no per-request consent check in the inspected path. This creates an undisclosed runtime telemetry privacy risk that warrants a warning, but not a publish block.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A CLI or engine operation invokes a model request while Baker runtime ID variables are populated.
Impact
OpenRouter can associate model requests and their inputs with Baker company, organization, chat, and acting-user identifiers.
Mechanism
The request path builds attribution from Baker runtime IDs and adds it to OpenRouter user, session, and trace fields alongside the model input.
AI rationale
Model requests automatically include Baker company, organization, chat, and acting-user identifiers as OpenRouter attribution fields, with no per-request consent check in the inspected path. This creates an undisclosed runtime telemetry privacy risk that warrants a warning, but not a publish block.
Evidence
dist/chunk-QEMYOOZN.jsdist/chunk-6XWTVAJN.jsdist/chunk-VT64WKF6.js
Network endpoints2
openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completionsopenrouter.ai/api/v1/systemone
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 85.0% confidence as Unknown with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The CLI builds request attribution from Baker runtime company, organization, chat, and acting-user ID variables.
- It adds company, organization, chat, and user identifiers to OpenRouter request and trace fields.
- The attribution also builds an OpenRouter user value containing company, chat, and user identifiers.
- Model request callers include those attribution fields in POST bodies sent to OpenRouter.
Evidence against
- The requests use the OpenRouter key with OpenRouter, the credential’s own service.
- These requests occur when a CLI or engine operation invokes a model feature; no install-time transmission was identified.
- The flagged child-process use handles media processing, while the output capture code is gated by debug logging.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsTelemetry
Source & flagged code
8 flaggeddist/chunk-3WEWQWRV.jsView file
59patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 59
Medium
60patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 60
Medium
dist/organization-VVOJFHR4.jsView file
37// src/commands/organization/pull.ts
L38: import { execFile } from "child_process";
L39: import {
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/organization-VVOJFHR4.jsView on unpkg · L37Findings
2 Critical4 High6 Medium6 Low
CriticalTrojan Source Unicodedist/chunk-QCY7IUWS.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/chunk-QCY7IUWS.js
HighChild Processdist/organization-VVOJFHR4.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/chunk-6XWTVAJN.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/chunk-6XWTVAJN.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/add-E3U4OAXK.js#virtual:string-array:round1
MediumSecret Patterndist/chunk-3WEWQWRV.js
MediumDynamic Require
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumSecret Patterndist/chunk-3WEWQWRV.js
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @koda-sl/baker-cli@0.627.0.
See all versions of @koda-sl/baker-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @koda-sl/baker-cli@0.627.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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