--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@kody-ade/kody-engine/v/0.4.531" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@kody-ade/kody-engine/v/0.4.531.md" package: "@kody-ade/kody-engine" report_status: "published" title: "@kody-ade/kody-engine@0.4.531 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "0.4.531" --- # @kody-ade/kody-engine@0.4.531 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — Remote backend control can cause CI code execution and disclosure of selected environment secrets. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Credential Exfiltration - **Selected version:** 0.4.531 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) In GitHub Actions, the CLI contacts a package-controlled default backend, installs remote definitions, and can execute their scripts. It also uploads declared environment secrets to that backend. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-08T10:19:34.972Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-08T10:21:04.567Z - **Download time:** 758 ms - **Static scan time:** 3828 ms - **AI review time:** 85008 ms - **Total time:** 89595 ms ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** In GitHub Actions, the CLI contacts a package-controlled default backend, installs remote definitions, and can execute their scripts. It also uploads declared environment secrets to that backend. - **Trigger:** Running kody-engine in a GitHub Actions event with default definition hydration enabled. - **Impact:** Remote backend control can cause CI code execution and disclosure of selected environment secrets. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, dist/bin/kody.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-08T10:21:04.567Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** remote definition download, bash execution, and secret upload via OIDC-authenticated API - **Attack narrative:** The CLI automatically hydrates remote definitions in GitHub Actions, using a hard-coded Kody dashboard by default. Those definitions are persisted into the repository workspace and script-backed capabilities execute their tools/run.sh with selected secrets. When a requested secret is found only in the environment, the CLI PUTs it to the same remote backend, making backend compromise or operator control a credential-exfiltration and CI remote-code-execution path. - **Rationale:** Source confirms a hard-coded remote control plane can deliver executable definitions and receive environment secrets during normal CI CLI execution. This is concrete malicious-capable behavior, not merely scanner similarity. - **Files touched:** .kody-engine/definitions, .kody-engine/definitions.tmp-\* - **Network endpoints:** https://kody-dashboard-aguy.vercel.app/api/kody/engine/backend, https://kody-dashboard-aguy.vercel.app/api/kody/engine/secret ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for:** dist/bin/kody.js has no lifecycle hooks but its CLI auto-hydrates in GitHub Actions., Hydration fetches backend definitions from hard-coded kody-dashboard-aguy.vercel.app using Actions OIDC., Hydrated definitions are written under .kody-engine/definitions and script capabilities are executed with bash., Named environment secrets are uploaded to /api/kody/engine/secret when absent from the remote vault., The remote definition bundle has only self-consistency hashing, not a pinned trusted signature. - **Evidence against:** package.json defines no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook., Command execution occurs after CLI/CI invocation, not package import. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/kody.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L970: // src/verify.ts L971: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L972: function buildVerifyEnv(source = process.env) { ``` ### 3. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/kody.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L995: cwd, L996: shell: true, L997: env: buildVerifyEnv(), ``` ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 7. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/kody.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L3508: // src/repoWorkspace.ts L3509: import { spawn as spawn2, spawnSync } from "child_process"; L3510: import * as fs9 from "fs"; L3511: import * as path10 from "path"; L3512: function buildCloneProcess(repo, token, baseEnv = process.env) { L3513: const url = `https://github.com/${repo}.git`; L3514: const env = { ...baseEnv }; ``` ### 8. Critical: Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/kody.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L11: L12: // package.json L13: var package_default; ... L75: type: "git", L76: url: "git+https://github.com/aharonyaircohen/kody-engine.git" L77: }, ... L98: const raw = fs.readFileSync(path.join(pkgDir, "package.json"), "utf8"); L99: const v = JSON.parse(raw)?.version; L100: return typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0 ? v : "unknown"; ... L111: let source = null; L112: for (const spec of candidateSpecs(process.platform, process.arch)) { L113: try { ``` ### 9. Critical: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/kody.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L11: L12: // package.json L13: var package_default; ... L75: type: "git", L76: url: "git+https://github.com/aharonyaircohen/kody-engine.git" L77: }, ... L98: const raw = fs.readFileSync(path.join(pkgDir, "package.json"), "utf8"); L99: const v = JSON.parse(raw)?.version; L100: return typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0 ? v : "unknown"; ... L111: let source = null; L112: for (const spec of candidateSpecs(process.platform, process.arch)) { L113: try { ``` ### 10. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/kody.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L11: L12: // package.json L13: var package_default; ... L75: type: "git", L76: url: "git+https://github.com/aharonyaircohen/kody-engine.git" L77: }, ... L98: const raw = fs.readFileSync(path.join(pkgDir, "package.json"), "utf8"); L99: const v = JSON.parse(raw)?.version; L100: return typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0 ? v : "unknown"; ... L111: let source = null; L112: for (const spec of candidateSpecs(process.platform, process.arch)) { L113: try { ``` ### 11. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/kody.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/bin/kody.js L11: L12: // package.json L13: var package_default; ... L75: type: "git", L76: url: "git+https://github.com/aharonyaircohen/kody-engine.git" L77: }, ... L98: const raw = fs.readFileSync(path.join(pkgDir, "package.json"), "utf8"); L99: const v = JSON.parse(raw)?.version; L100: return typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0 ? v : "unknown"; ... L111: let source = null; L112: for (const spec of candidateSpecs(process.platform, process.arch)) { L113: try { ``` ### 12. Medium: Protestware - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 90.0% Package source has broad protestware-like patterns that need review. ### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 14. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 15. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** dist/runtime-services/goal-scheduler/scheduler.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = dist/runtime-services/goal-scheduler/scheduler.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 31266 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 16. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 17. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/kody.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @kody-ade/kody-engine@0.4.532 matchedPath = dist/bin/kody.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGtvZHktYWRlL2tvZHktZW5naW5l:0.4.532 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 18. High: Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/bin/kody.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 98c915494b53bf9b signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @kody-ade/kody-engine@0.4.532 matchedPath = dist/bin/kody.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGtvZHktYWRlL2tvZHktZW5naW5l:0.4.532 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 2 summary = package final verdict is malicious ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 7 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 7 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 7 ### Published dependency entries - @actions/cache ^6.0.0 (Dependency) - @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk 0.2.119 (Dependency) - @kody-ade/engine-contracts 0.1.0 (Dependency) - @modelcontextprotocol/sdk ^1.29.0 (Dependency) - ajv ^8.18.0 (Dependency) - convex ^1.17.0 (Dependency) - zod ^4.0.0 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @kody-ade/kody-engine - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.4.531 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-08-07T00:25:59.983Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-06-30T21:46:36.547Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-08-15T14:00:04.869Z - **Known versions:** 106 - **Latest version:** 0.4.588 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** kody — autonomous development engine. Single-session Claude Code agent behind a generic executor + declarative implementation profiles. - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22 - **Artifact files:** 38 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,232,579 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()