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@kody-ade/kody-engine@0.4.555: Malicious npm security report | LPM Firewall

registry / @kody-ade/kody-engine / 0.4.555

@kody-ade/kody-engine@0.4.555

kody — autonomous development engine. Single-session Claude Code agent behind a generic executor + declarative implementation profiles.

AI Security Review

scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

On a GitHub Actions execution, declared runtime secrets absent from the Kody vault are collected from environment variables and sent to the package's default external dashboard. This is credential exfiltration despite documentation stating that user secrets are not copied.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Run kody-engine in GitHub Actions with OIDC identity and an environment-backed declared runtime secret.

Impact

Exposes CI secrets to a package-controlled external receiver.

Mechanism

Automatic fallback-secret migration to a default remote Kody API.

Attack narrative

The CLI's runtime-secret resolver reads configured secret values from its environment when the remote vault has no value. In GitHub Actions, it then automatically PUTs those fallback secrets to `/api/kody/engine/secret`, authenticated with an Actions OIDC token. The API host falls back to a hard-coded Vercel dashboard without requiring a user-provided endpoint. This conflicts with the README's assurance that user secrets are not copied into Actions.

Rationale

Source establishes a concrete, default-enabled remote transmission of environment secrets during CI execution. The lack of an install hook does not mitigate this runtime credential-exfiltration path.

Evidence

package.jsondist/bin/kody.jsREADME.md

Network endpoints1

kody-dashboard-aguy.vercel.app/api/kody/engine/secret

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source

dist/bin/kody.jsView file

11Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L11: L12: // package.json L13: var package_default; ... L75: type: "git", L76: url: "git+https://github.com/aharonyaircohen/kody-engine.git" L77: }, ... L98: const raw = fs.readFileSync(path.join(pkgDir, "package.json"), "utf8"); L99: const v = JSON.parse(raw)?.version; L100: return typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0 ? v : "unknown"; ... L111: let source = null; L112: for (const spec of candidateSpecs(process.platform, process.arch)) { L113: try {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg · L11

1075// src/verify.ts L1076: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L1077: function buildVerifyEnv(source = process.env) {

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg · L1075

1100cwd, L1101: shell: true, L1102: env: buildVerifyEnv(),

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg · L1100

3683// src/repoWorkspace.ts L3684: import { spawn as spawn2, spawnSync } from "child_process"; L3685: import * as fs10 from "fs"; L3686: import * as path11 from "path"; L3687: function buildCloneProcess(repo, token, baseEnv = process.env) { L3688: const url = `https://github.com/${repo}.git`; L3689: const env = { ...baseEnv };

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg · L3683

11L12: // package.json L13: var package_default; ... L75: type: "git", L76: url: "git+https://github.com/aharonyaircohen/kody-engine.git" L77: }, ... L98: const raw = fs.readFileSync(path.join(pkgDir, "package.json"), "utf8"); L99: const v = JSON.parse(raw)?.version; L100: return typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0 ? v : "unknown"; ... L111: let source = null; L112: for (const spec of candidateSpecs(process.platform, process.arch)) { L113: try {

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg · L11

11L12: // package.json L13: var package_default; ... L75: type: "git", L76: url: "git+https://github.com/aharonyaircohen/kody-engine.git" L77: }, ... L98: const raw = fs.readFileSync(path.join(pkgDir, "package.json"), "utf8"); L99: const v = JSON.parse(raw)?.version; L100: return typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0 ? v : "unknown"; ... L111: let source = null; L112: for (const spec of candidateSpecs(process.platform, process.arch)) { L113: try {

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg · L11

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into an external AI-agent control surface. const tmp = path.join(destDir, `.claude.${process.pid}.${Date.now()}.tmp`); fs.copyFileSync(source, tmp); function loadConfig(projectDir = process.cwd()) { // src/outputContractHooks.ts hookSpecificOutput: { var init_outputContractHooks = __esm({ "src/outputContractHooks.ts"() { else if (ent.isFile()) fs4.copyFileSync(s, d);

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @kody-ade/kody-engine@0.4.548 matchedPath = dist/bin/kody.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGtvZHktYWRlL2tvZHktZW5naW5l:0.4.548 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 98c915494b53bf9b signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @kody-ade/kody-engine@0.4.548 matchedPath = dist/bin/kody.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGtvZHktYWRlL2tvZHktZW5naW5l:0.4.548 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 2 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg

dist/runtime-services/goal-scheduler/scheduler.shView file

•path = dist/runtime-services/goal-scheduler/scheduler.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 31266 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

dist/runtime-services/goal-scheduler/scheduler.shView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

10 flagged

dist/bin/kody.jsView file

11Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L11: L12: // package.json L13: var package_default; ... L75: type: "git", L76: url: "git+https://github.com/aharonyaircohen/kody-engine.git" L77: }, ... L98: const raw = fs.readFileSync(path.join(pkgDir, "package.json"), "utf8"); L99: const v = JSON.parse(raw)?.version; L100: return typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0 ? v : "unknown"; ... L111: let source = null; L112: for (const spec of candidateSpecs(process.platform, process.arch)) { L113: try {

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg · L11

1075// src/verify.ts L1076: import { spawn } from "child_process"; L1077: function buildVerifyEnv(source = process.env) {

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg · L1075

1100cwd, L1101: shell: true, L1102: env: buildVerifyEnv(),

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg · L1100

3683// src/repoWorkspace.ts L3684: import { spawn as spawn2, spawnSync } from "child_process"; L3685: import * as fs10 from "fs"; L3686: import * as path11 from "path"; L3687: function buildCloneProcess(repo, token, baseEnv = process.env) { L3688: const url = `https://github.com/${repo}.git`; L3689: const env = { ...baseEnv };

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg · L3683

11L12: // package.json L13: var package_default; ... L75: type: "git", L76: url: "git+https://github.com/aharonyaircohen/kody-engine.git" L77: }, ... L98: const raw = fs.readFileSync(path.join(pkgDir, "package.json"), "utf8"); L99: const v = JSON.parse(raw)?.version; L100: return typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0 ? v : "unknown"; ... L111: let source = null; L112: for (const spec of candidateSpecs(process.platform, process.arch)) { L113: try {

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg · L11

11L12: // package.json L13: var package_default; ... L75: type: "git", L76: url: "git+https://github.com/aharonyaircohen/kody-engine.git" L77: }, ... L98: const raw = fs.readFileSync(path.join(pkgDir, "package.json"), "utf8"); L99: const v = JSON.parse(raw)?.version; L100: return typeof v === "string" && v.length > 0 ? v : "unknown"; ... L111: let source = null; L112: for (const spec of candidateSpecs(process.platform, process.arch)) { L113: try {

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg · L11

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into an external AI-agent control surface. const tmp = path.join(destDir, `.claude.${process.pid}.${Date.now()}.tmp`); fs.copyFileSync(source, tmp); function loadConfig(projectDir = process.cwd()) { // src/outputContractHooks.ts hookSpecificOutput: { var init_outputContractHooks = __esm({ "src/outputContractHooks.ts"() { else if (ent.isFile()) fs4.copyFileSync(s, d);

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @kody-ade/kody-engine@0.4.548 matchedPath = dist/bin/kody.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGtvZHktYWRlL2tvZHktZW5naW5l:0.4.548 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 98c915494b53bf9b signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @kody-ade/kody-engine@0.4.548 matchedPath = dist/bin/kody.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGtvZHktYWRlL2tvZHktZW5naW5l:0.4.548 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 2 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

dist/bin/kody.jsView on unpkg

dist/runtime-services/goal-scheduler/scheduler.shView file

•path = dist/runtime-services/goal-scheduler/scheduler.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 31266 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

dist/runtime-services/goal-scheduler/scheduler.shView on unpkg