@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.60.4
剧本阶段统一 CLI:素材转 Script v4,并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook performs first-party agent skill setup and can replace an existing same-name skill, which warrants a lifecycle warning. The inspected behavior does not establish a concrete malicious attack or justify a publish block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package runs its skill installer during npm postinstall.
- The installer targets Claude, Agents, and Codex skill directories and deletes an existing scriptctl directory before copying the bundled skill.
- The installer checks opt-out environment flags, but otherwise runs from its postinstall entry point.
- The bundled skill describes scriptctl as a local screenplay and asset workflow CLI.
- Gemini proxy handling reads proxy settings for SDK transport.
- The ingest monitor binds its HTTP server to localhost.
- The observed agent setup installs this package's own named skill; the inspected code does not show a remote skill source or a broader agent configuration write.
- The network and localhost server indicators are consistent with Gemini transport and a local ingest monitor.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgSource file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/infra/llm/gemini-video-model.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.60.4.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.60.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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