@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.61.2
剧本阶段统一 CLI:素材转 Script v4,并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis package has a real automatic AI-agent control-surface mutation, but it is a first-party package-owned skill installation rather than a demonstrated malicious chain. Its lifecycle script does not show exfiltration, remote payload loading, broad configuration replacement, or self-dependent lifecycle recursion.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The install lifecycle automatically runs a skill installer.
- The installer targets Claude, Agents, and Codex skill directories under the user home directory.
- It deletes and replaces the package-named skill directory in each target.
- The mutation is limited to a package-named subdirectory and copies the package's bundled skill.
- The installer has an environment-variable opt-out and skips source checkouts.
- No self-dependency, lifecycle network request, credential harvesting, or arbitrary command execution was found in the install script.
- Network and credential use in the CLI is tied to explicit script-processing and publish commands.
Source & flagged code
9 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgSource file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/infra/llm/gemini-video-model.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.61.2.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.61.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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