@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.62.4
剧本阶段统一 CLI:素材转 Script v4,并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is an unconsented postinstall mutation of multiple agent skill roots, creating a lifecycle extension risk. The bounded first-party installer and absence of a concrete malicious payload support warning rather than blocking publication.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Installation automatically runs a skill installer.
- The installer targets three AI-agent skill roots under the user's home directory.
- It deletes and replaces its named skill directory in each target.
- The installer limits deletion to its own scriptctl subdirectory and supports opt-out environment variables.
- No install-time network request, credential harvesting, or remote payload execution was found.
- The runtime update action is an explicit CLI command, not a manifest self-dependency.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgSource file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/infra/llm/gemini-video-model.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.62.4.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.62.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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