@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.11
剧本阶段统一 CLI:素材转 Script v4,并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook performs automatic first-party skill setup in user-level AI-agent directories and replaces the existing scriptctl skill there. This warrants a warning as an agent extension lifecycle risk; the inspected code does not establish a concrete malicious attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall hook automatically runs the skill installer.
- The installer targets the user's Claude, agents, and Codex skill directories.
- It recursively removes each existing package-owned skill directory, then copies the bundled skill into its place.
- The script supports opt-out flags, but installation proceeds by default.
- The installer replaces only the scriptctl subdirectory in each listed skill directory.
- The bundled skill describes local scriptctl workflows; no remote endpoint is established by the inspected installation code.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgSource file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/infra/llm/gemini-video-model.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.11.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.11 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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