@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.14
剧本阶段统一 CLI:素材转 Script v4,并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook performs package-owned agent skill setup, which merits a warning under the extension lifecycle policy. The inspected source does not establish an unconsented broad agent control-surface takeover or another confirmed attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall hook runs a script that installs the package's bundled skill into Claude, agents, and Codex skill directories.
- The installer removes and replaces only the scriptctl skill subdirectory and provides environment-variable opt-outs.
- The view server binds to loopback; the Gemini adapter uses its SDK with a caller-configurable base URL.
- Inspected source shows first-party skill setup rather than broad agent configuration changes or a remote payload channel.
- The flagged dynamic require loads the declared Google SDK, and the view server uses a loopback address.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgSource file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
dist/infra/llm/gemini-video-model.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.14.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.14 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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