@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.15
剧本阶段统一 CLI:素材转 Script v4,并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook performs automatic first-party agent skill setup in user-level directories, which warrants a warning under the agent integration policy. The inspected code does not establish broad agent control changes or another concrete attack chain.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package postinstall automatically runs the skill installer.
- The installer targets the user's Claude, agents, and Codex skill directories and replaces the package's own scriptctl skill subdirectory.
- The installer copies the bundled skill into those directories during the postinstall run.
- The writes are limited to a scriptctl-named skill subdirectory; the inspected code does not show broad agent configuration changes or credential exfiltration.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgA manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.
dist/chunk-3LPIMYYI.jsView on unpkg · L150Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.15.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.15 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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