@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.16
剧本阶段统一 CLI:素材转 Script v4,并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall automatically replaces the package's own skill directory in user-level agent locations, creating an agent extension lifecycle risk. Its limited destination scope and opt-out support do not establish a publish-blockable attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs scripts/install-skill.mjs automatically during postinstall.
- The installer targets .claude/skills, .agents/skills, and .codex/skills.
- For each target, it recursively removes and recopies only the scriptctl subdirectory.
- The installer checks opt-out environment variables before proceeding.
- The install operation is limited to the package-named skill directory; no broader agent configuration write or remote payload execution was identified.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgA manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.
dist/chunk-YOCQDDQC.jsView on unpkg · L150Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.16.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.16 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.