@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.18
剧本阶段统一 CLI:素材转 Script v4,并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook automatically replaces a same-named skill directory in user-level agent locations. This is first-party agent extension setup, which warrants a warning, but the inspected source does not establish a concrete attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package runs scripts/install-skill.mjs from its postinstall hook.
- The hook targets scriptctl skill directories under the user's .claude, .agents, and .codex directories.
- Installation recursively removes the existing scriptctl target directory and copies the package's skill into its place.
- The hook supports opt-out environment variables.
- The postinstall behavior installs this package's own named skill; the inspected code does not show credential collection or a remote payload in this setup path.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/review-agent.jsView on unpkg · L30Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.18.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.18 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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