--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@lingjingai/scriptctl/v/0.63.18" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@lingjingai/scriptctl/v/0.63.18.md" package: "@lingjingai/scriptctl" report_status: "published" title: "@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.18 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.63.18" --- # @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.18 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 0.63.18 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The postinstall hook automatically replaces a same-named skill directory in user-level agent locations. This is first-party agent extension setup, which warrants a warning, but the inspected source does not establish a concrete attack. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 91.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-12T07:09:05.389Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-12T07:09:59.358Z - **Download time:** 504 ms - **Static scan time:** 1333 ms - **AI review time:** 52131 ms - **Total time:** 53969 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The postinstall hook installs the package's scriptctl skill in three user-level agent skill directories. It recursively replaces any existing scriptctl directory at each target. - **Trigger:** Package installation runs the postinstall hook unless the supported opt-out variable is set. - **Impact:** The installation changes user-level agent skill configuration and can replace a pre-existing scriptctl skill directory. No confirmed credential theft or remote execution was established from the inspected setup code. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/install-skill.mjs - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-12T07:09:59.358Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The hook removes each target directory and copies the bundled skill into it. - **Rationale:** The postinstall hook automatically replaces a same-named skill directory in user-level agent locations. This is first-party agent extension setup, which warrants a warning, but the inspected source does not establish a concrete attack. - **Files touched:** scripts/install-skill.mjs, .claude/skills/scriptctl, .agents/skills/scriptctl, .codex/skills/scriptctl ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 91.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The package runs scripts/install-skill.mjs from its postinstall hook., The hook targets scriptctl skill directories under the user's .claude, .agents, and .codex directories., Installation recursively removes the existing scriptctl target directory and copies the package's skill into its place., The hook supports opt-out environment variables. - **Evidence against:** The postinstall behavior installs this package's own named skill; the inspected code does not show credential collection or a remote payload in this setup path. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.18. - Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.18 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install-skill.mjs ``` ### 2. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 3. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/review-agent.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L30: ${d?"rewired":"cleared"} ${o.length} scene binding(s) and ${s.length} speaker(s)${d?` to ${Be(e,t.id,d)}`:""}`}let c=t.raw.states;return c.splice(c.findIndex(d=>d.state_id===r.id),... L31: moved ${h.length} scene reference(s), ${g.length} speaker(s), ${[...l].filter(([f,p])=>f!==p).length} state mapping(s)`+H(e,s)}import{z as W}from"zod";var hs=["scene-reference","ac... L32: ]))`;continue}else if(o[d]==="$"){s+=`($|(?=[\r ``` ### 4. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/chunk-YOCQDDQC.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L125: `)} L126: `}function Be(e){return e!==null&&typeof e=="object"&&!Array.isArray(e)}function ct(e,t){return e[t]===void 0||typeof e[t]=="string"}function Ca(e){return e===null||typeof e=="stri... L127: `)} ``` ### 5. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 6. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 7. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 8. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/review-agent.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L30: ${d?"rewired":"cleared"} ${o.length} scene binding(s) and ${s.length} speaker(s)${d?` to ${Be(e,t.id,d)}`:""}`}let c=t.raw.states;return c.splice(c.findIndex(d=>d.state_id===r.id),... L31: moved ${h.length} scene reference(s), ${g.length} speaker(s), ${[...l].filter(([f,p])=>f!==p).length} state mapping(s)`+H(e,s)}import{z as W}from"zod";var hs=["scene-reference","ac... L32: ]))`;continue}else if(o[d]==="$"){s+=`($|(?=[\r ``` ### 9. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/review-agent.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L30: ${d?"rewired":"cleared"} ${o.length} scene binding(s) and ${s.length} speaker(s)${d?` to ${Be(e,t.id,d)}`:""}`}let c=t.raw.states;return c.splice(c.findIndex(d=>d.state_id===r.id),... L31: moved ${h.length} scene reference(s), ${g.length} speaker(s), ${[...l].filter(([f,p])=>f!==p).length} state mapping(s)`+H(e,s)}import{z as W}from"zod";var hs=["scene-reference","ac... L32: ]))`;continue}else if(o[d]==="$"){s+=`($|(?=[\r ``` ### 10. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** scripts/install-skill.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L22: const TARGET_SKILL_ROOTS = [ L23: path.join(".claude", "skills"), L24: path.join(".agents", "skills"), L25: path.join(".codex", "skills"), L26: ]; ... L58: const stamped = text.replace(/^(\s+)scriptctl_version:.*$/m, `$1scriptctl_version: "${version}"`); L59: fs.writeFileSync(skillMdPath, stamped, "utf-8"); L60: } catch { ... L67: fs.rmSync(target, { recursive: true, force: true }); L68: fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(target), { recursive: true }); L69: fs.cpSync(skillSrc, target, { recursive: true }); L70: stampVersion(path.join(target, "SKILL.md"), version); ``` ### 11. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/chunk-YOCQDDQC.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/cli.js -> dist/chunk-YOCQDDQC.js L150: L151: `);i&&(o.systemInstruction=i),t.responseJsonSchema&&!n&&(o.responseMimeType="application/json",o.responseJsonSchema=t.responseJsonSchema);let r={model:this.model.model,contents:[{r... L152: L153: \u53EA\u8FD4\u56DE JSON \u5BF9\u8C61\u672C\u8EAB\uFF0C\u4E0D\u8981\u8F93\u51FA\u4EFB\u4F55\u89E3\u91CA\u3001\u524D\u8A00\u3001Markdown \u4EE3\u7801\u5757\u6216\u5176\u4ED6\u6587\u5... L154: Gemini \u4E0A\u4F20\u4F1A\u6210\u529F\u3001\u968F\u540E\u7684\u6587\u4EF6\u8F6E\u8BE2/\u751F\u6210\u4F1A\u6302\uFF08Node \u5185\u7F6E fetch \u9ED8\u8BA4\u4E0D\u8D70\u4EE3\u7406\uFF... ... L156: `),{files:{upload:c=>ou({apiKey:e,filePath:c.file,mimeType:c.config?.mimeType??"video/mp4",timeout ``` ### 12. High: Obfuscated - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package source appears deliberately obfuscated. ### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 14. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 15. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 12 - **Optional dependencies:** 5 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 11 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 17 ### Published dependency entries - @anthropic-ai/sdk ^0.111.0 (Dependency) - @google/genai ^2.11.0 (Dependency) - commander ^12.1.0 (Dependency) - fast-json-patch ^3.1.1 (Dependency) - fast-xml-parser ^5.9.0 (Dependency) - google-auth-library ^10.9.0 (Dependency) - https-proxy-agent ^9.1.0 (Dependency) - jszip ^3.10.1 (Dependency) - nanoid ^5.1.16 (Dependency) - proper-lockfile ^4.1.2 (Dependency) - undici ^7.16.0 (Dependency) - yaml ^2.8.1 (Dependency) - @ai-sdk/google ^4.0.63 (OptionalDependency) - @ai-sdk/openai-compatible ^3.0.48 (OptionalDependency) - @ai-sdk/provider ^4.0.4 (OptionalDependency) - @mastra/core ^1.64.0 (OptionalDependency) - zod ^4.5.4 (OptionalDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @lingjingai/scriptctl - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.63.18 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-09-20T08:26:26.071Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-02T09:34:38.241Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-21T21:01:48.097Z - **Known versions:** 64 - **Latest version:** 0.66.18 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** 剧本阶段统一 CLI：素材转 Script v4，并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。 - **Maintainers:** lizheyong, tom\_wang\_996, hkpauline401, starmoon77, pinkuo, huangjie-haiubcquibcwd, snychng - **Keywords:** scriptctl, screenplay, cli, agent-sandbox - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22.22.0 - **Artifact files:** 132 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 979,826 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()