@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.20
剧本阶段统一 CLI:素材转 Script v4,并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic, unprompted setup and replacement of a user-home agent extension leave a concrete lifecycle risk, though the behavior is limited to this package’s own skill. The evidence supports a warning for agent extension lifecycle risk, not a confirmed attack warranting a publish block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest runs the skill installer automatically through a postinstall hook.
- The installer targets the user’s Claude Code, agents, and Codex skill directories.
- The hook runs unless an environment variable opts out; it skips source checkouts.
- It recursively removes and replaces the package’s same-named skill directory at each target.
- The bundled skill describes using the scriptctl CLI and reading its output.
- The installer is limited to the package-owned scriptctl skill directory; the inspected code does not show broader agent settings changes or content export.
- The installer supports an environment-variable opt-out.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/review-agent.jsView on unpkg · L30Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.20.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.20 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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