---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@lingjingai/scriptctl/v/0.63.5"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@lingjingai/scriptctl/v/0.63.5.md"
package: "@lingjingai/scriptctl"
report_status: "published"
title: "@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.5 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.63.5"
---

# @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.5 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk
- **Selected version:** 0.63.5
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The postinstall hook performs automatic, bounded installation of the package-owned agent skill, which fits the warning category for first-party extension setup. The inspected flagged runtime excerpts show ordinary package behavior and provide no separate concrete attack evidence.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 87.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-12T07:06:59.611Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-12T07:07:38.409Z
- **Download time:** 764 ms
- **Static scan time:** 4849 ms
- **AI review time:** 33184 ms
- **Total time:** 38798 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** The automatic postinstall installs the package’s own scriptctl skill into user skill directories. This creates a bounded agent-extension lifecycle risk, but the inspected code does not establish a broader control-surface attack.

- **Trigger:** Installing the package with npm runs its postinstall hook.

- **Impact:** An existing scriptctl skill in those specific locations can be replaced with the package’s bundled version.

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-12T07:07:38.409Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The hook removes and recopies the scriptctl subdirectory beneath the user’s Claude, agents, and Codex skill roots; environment flags can skip installation.

- **Rationale:** The postinstall hook performs automatic, bounded installation of the package-owned agent skill, which fits the warning category for first-party extension setup. The inspected flagged runtime excerpts show ordinary package behavior and provide no separate concrete attack evidence.

- **Files touched:** ~/.claude/skills/scriptctl, ~/.agents/skills/scriptctl, ~/.codex/skills/scriptctl

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 87.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** package.json runs scripts/install-skill.mjs automatically through postinstall., The installer replaces and copies only the package-owned scriptctl skill into three user skill directories., The installer supports opt-out environment flags; its writes are limited to the scriptctl subdirectory under those roots., The Gemini adapter uploads the selected local media file through its configured client., The view server’s readSafe function rejects paths that resolve outside its workspace root., The flagged CLI and review-agent files contain CLI setup and timestamp parsing behavior in the inspected excerpts.

- **Evidence against:** The install hook does not write a broad agent configuration or control surface in the inspected code., The inspected runtime excerpts show package-aligned media upload and workspace-bounded file reading, not credential harvesting or exfiltration.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.5.

- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.5 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.5/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install-skill.mjs
```

### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. Medium: Dynamic Require
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** dist/infra/llm/gemini-video-model.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.5/dist/infra/llm/gemini-video-model.js>)

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L332: // actually exercised (keeps text-only runs free of @google/genai).
L333: const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L334: function createGoogleClient(apiKey, timeoutMs, baseUrl) {
```

### 5. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 7. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 8. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** scripts/install-skill.mjs
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.5/scripts/install-skill.mjs>)

Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L22: const TARGET_SKILL_ROOTS = [
L23: path.join(".claude", "skills"),
L24: path.join(".agents", "skills"),
L25: path.join(".codex", "skills"),
L26: ];
...
L58: const stamped = text.replace(/^(\s+)scriptctl_version:.*$/m, `$1scriptctl_version: "${version}"`);
L59: fs.writeFileSync(skillMdPath, stamped, "utf-8");
L60: } catch {
...
L67: fs.rmSync(target, { recursive: true, force: true });
L68: fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(target), { recursive: true });
L69: fs.cpSync(skillSrc, target, { recursive: true });
L70: stampVersion(path.join(target, "SKILL.md"), version);
```

### 9. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 10. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 11. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 12. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.5/dist/bin.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.0
matchedPath = dist/bin.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpbmdqaW5nYWkvc2NyaXB0Y3Rs:0.63.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 13. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/infra/llm/gemini-video-model.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.5/dist/infra/llm/gemini-video-model.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.0
matchedPath = dist/infra/llm/gemini-video-model.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpbmdqaW5nYWkvc2NyaXB0Y3Rs:0.63.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 14. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/usecases/ingest/view-server.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.5/dist/usecases/ingest/view-server.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.0
matchedPath = dist/usecases/ingest/view-server.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpbmdqaW5nYWkvc2NyaXB0Y3Rs:0.63.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** dist/review-agent.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.5/dist/review-agent.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.0
matchedPath = dist/review-agent.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpbmdqaW5nYWkvc2NyaXB0Y3Rs:0.63.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 16. High: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** dist/bin.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.63.5/dist/bin.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.62.4
matchedIdentity = npm:QGxpbmdqaW5nYWkvc2NyaXB0Y3Rs:0.62.4
similarity = 0.925
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 11
- **Optional dependencies:** 4
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 8
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 15

### Published dependency entries
- @anthropic-ai/sdk ^0.111.0 (Dependency)
- @google/genai ^2.11.0 (Dependency)
- commander ^12.1.0 (Dependency)
- fast-json-patch ^3.1.1 (Dependency)
- fast-xml-parser ^5.9.0 (Dependency)
- https-proxy-agent ^9.1.0 (Dependency)
- jszip ^3.10.1 (Dependency)
- nanoid ^5.1.16 (Dependency)
- proper-lockfile ^4.1.2 (Dependency)
- undici ^7.16.0 (Dependency)
- yaml ^2.8.1 (Dependency)
- @ai-sdk/google ^4.0.63 (OptionalDependency)
- @ai-sdk/provider ^4.0.4 (OptionalDependency)
- @mastra/core ^1.64.0 (OptionalDependency)
- zod ^4.5.4 (OptionalDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @lingjingai/scriptctl
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.63.5
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-09-12T21:53:50.238Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-02T09:34:38.241Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-10-21T21:01:48.097Z
- **Known versions:** 64
- **Latest version:** 0.66.18
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** 剧本阶段统一 CLI：素材转 Script v4，并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
- **Maintainers:** lizheyong, tom\_wang\_996, hkpauline401, starmoon77, pinkuo, huangjie-haiubcquibcwd, snychng
- **Keywords:** scriptctl, screenplay, cli, agent-sandbox
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20
- **Artifact files:** 888
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 6,843,078 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@lingjingai/scriptctl/v/0.63.5>)
