@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.64.0
剧本阶段统一 CLI:素材转 Script v4,并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook performs guarded, package-owned skill setup in three user-level agent skill directories, replacing only the scriptctl subdirectory. This is a lifecycle extension risk, but the inspected source does not establish malicious behavior or justify a publish block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall hook runs a script that copies the package-owned scriptctl skill into three user-level agent skill directories.
- The installer removes the existing scriptctl skill directory before copying its replacement; environment variables can opt out.
- The package also exposes an explicit update command that runs npm to install a release of this same package.
- The inspected review-agent code sends JSON POST requests; the excerpt does not establish credential theft or an unrelated recipient.
- The skill installer limits its removal to the scriptctl subdirectory and copies the bundled skill there.
- No inspected source establishes a hidden payload, credential exfiltration, or an unconsented broad agent configuration write.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/review-agent.jsView on unpkg · L47Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.64.0.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.64.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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