@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.64.3
剧本阶段统一 CLI:素材转 Script v4,并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook performs automatic first-party agent skill setup across Claude, Agents, and Codex directories. This warrants a warning under the agent extension lifecycle policy, but the inspected source does not establish malicious behavior requiring a block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs the installer during postinstall.
- The installer removes and replaces its package-owned skill in Claude, Agents, and Codex skill directories.
- The installer supports environment-variable opt-outs, but otherwise loops over all three destinations.
- The installer copies the package's own scriptctl skill rather than fetching a remote extension.
- The inspected bundle excerpt sends a bearer credential to its configured provider URL; it does not establish an unrelated recipient.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/chunk-YYKX6SLG.jsView on unpkg · L164Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.64.3.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.64.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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