@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.65.0
剧本阶段统一 CLI:素材转 Script v4,并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource confirms an automatic postinstall that installs a first-party skill into user-level agent directories without an affirmative prompt. Its scope and inspected content support a warning for extension lifecycle risk, but do not establish a broader control hijack or a concrete attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest runs the skill installer automatically through its postinstall hook.
- The installer targets the scriptctl skill directory under the Claude, agents, and Codex skill roots.
- For each target, the installer removes that scriptctl directory and copies in this package’s own skill files.
- The installer has environment-variable opt-outs, but no affirmative consent prompt.
- The installed guide describes using scriptctl with local screenplay files.
- The installer’s deletion is scoped to the scriptctl child directory, rather than the surrounding skill roots.
- The inspected skill guide describes a package-aligned local CLI workflow.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/review-agent.jsView on unpkg · L54Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.65.0.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.65.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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