@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.65.4
剧本阶段统一 CLI:素材转 Script v4,并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe install hook performs automatic user-level agent skill setup without affirmative consent, which warrants a warning for first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. The copied skill is package-owned and focused on the package's CLI, so the inspected behavior does not establish a concrete attack supporting a block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs scripts/install-skill.mjs automatically after installation.
- The install script targets skill directories for Claude, agents, and Codex in the user's home directory.
- The script recursively replaces each existing scriptctl skill directory and copies in the packaged skill.
- Environment variables can disable this installation, but otherwise the hook proceeds without an affirmative setup prompt.
- The installed skill describes using scriptctl with local script files and the package's own CLI.
- The installer limits replacement to the scriptctl subdirectory and can be disabled with environment variables.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/review-agent.jsView on unpkg · L79Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.65.4.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.65.4 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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