@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.65.5
剧本阶段统一 CLI:素材转 Script v4,并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook mutates user-level agent skill directories without an interactive consent step and can overwrite an existing same-named skill. The installed content is first-party, so this supports a warning for agent extension lifecycle risk rather than a malicious verdict.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package postinstall runs the skill installer.
- The installer targets Claude, agents, and Codex skill directories under the user’s home directory.
- The installer loops through those targets and installs the package’s skill.
- It recursively removes an existing same-named target before copying the packaged skill.
- The copied skill is the package’s own scriptctl skill for screenplay CLI work.
- The installed skill is first-party and describes screenplay work; inspected source did not establish credential theft or other active attack behavior.
- The installer has environment-variable opt-outs.
Source & flagged code
9 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/chunk-AMHE5YHV.jsView on unpkg · L164Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.65.5.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.65.5 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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