@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.65.8
剧本阶段统一 CLI:素材转 Script v4,并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection confirms automatic, opt-out-capable installation of a first-party skill into user-level agent directories. This warrants a warning for agent extension lifecycle risk; the inspected behavior does not establish a concrete malicious attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs the skill installer automatically after installation.
- The installer targets the user's Claude, Agents, and Codex skill directories.
- The installer replaces only the package's scriptctl skill directory there, then copies in the bundled skill.
- The installer supports environment-variable opt-outs; the bundled skill describes local scriptctl workflows.
- The inspected installer contains no network transfer or command execution; its automatic effect is limited to installing the bundled skill.
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/review-agent.jsView on unpkg · L79Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.65.8.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.65.8 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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