registry / @lingjingai/scriptctl / 0.66.12
@lingjingai/scriptctl@0.66.12
剧本阶段统一 CLI：素材转 Script v4，并兼容 Script v3 的本地写作、精修、校验和发布。
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source confirms an npm postinstall that replaces the package-owned scriptctl skill folder in three global agent skill roots, with an environment opt-out. The skill is purpose-aligned and no broader settings mutation or credential transfer was established, so this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Installing the package runs its postinstall unless an environment opt-out is set.
Impact
Agents may use the installed skill, and an existing skill with the same name may be replaced. The inspected behavior supports an agent-extension lifecycle warning, not a confirmed attack.
Mechanism
The installer recursively removes each targeted scriptctl skill folder and copies in the bundled skill.
AI rationale
The source confirms an npm postinstall that replaces the package-owned scriptctl skill folder in three global agent skill roots, with an environment opt-out. The skill is purpose-aligned and no broader settings mutation or credential transfer was established, so this warrants a warning rather than a block.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/install-skill.mjsskills/scriptctl/SKILL.md~/.claude/skills/scriptctl~/.agents/skills/scriptctl~/.codex/skills/scriptctl
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 92.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The npm postinstall runs the skill installer, whose top-level call reaches its main routine.
- The installer targets the package-owned scriptctl folder under three global agent skill roots and recursively replaces that folder with the bundled skill.
- The bundled skill describes scriptctl workflows, including work on a local script file; environment variables can disable installation.
Evidence against
- The installer’s writes are scoped to the scriptctl skill subdirectory; the inspected source does not show broader agent settings changes or credential transfer.
- The skill content inspected describes first-party CLI workflows, including local-file work and explicit checkout and publish commands.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedPossibleObfuscation
Source & flagged code
8 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install-skill.mjs
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgdist/review-agent.jsView file
82L83: `)}),o.find=Bo({id:"find",description:"\u6309\u6B63\u6587\u6B63\u5219 / \u8BF4\u8BDD\u4EBA / \u7C7B\u578B\u5B9A\u4F4D action\uFF0C\u8FD4\u56DE\u951A\u70B9 + \u4F4D\u7F6E + \u547D\u...
L84: `))[s(19)](s(7))}async function Qu(e,t,o,n,s){let i=ua,r=await Su(e,t,o),l=Date[i(8)]();try{let a=i(1)+t+i(17)+o+i(24)+(Ko(o)-Ko(t))+i(26)+t+i(3)+Ko(t)+i(10)+n+i(4),c=await ki({con...
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/review-agent.jsView on unpkg · L8282L83: `)}),o.find=Bo({id:"find",description:"\u6309\u6B63\u6587\u6B63\u5219 / \u8BF4\u8BDD\u4EBA / \u7C7B\u578B\u5B9A\u4F4D action\uFF0C\u8FD4\u56DE\u951A\u70B9 + \u4F4D\u7F6E + \u547D\u...
L84: `))[s(19)](s(7))}async function Qu(e,t,o,n,s){let i=ua,r=await Su(e,t,o),l=Date[i(8)]();try{let a=i(1)+t+i(17)+o+i(24)+(Ko(o)-Ko(t))+i(26)+t+i(3)+Ko(t)+i(10)+n+i(4),c=await ki({con...
L85: `)}async function Du(e,t){let o=process.env.SD_AUDIO_APIKEY?.trim();if(!o)throw new Error("\u5168\u5267 ASR \u7F3A\u5C11 SD_AUDIO_APIKEY\uFF0C\u5C1A\u672A\u542F\u52A8\u5267\u672C\u...
L86: `);return o}function Zu(e,t){let o=Tt;return t+(e?.[o(52)][o(6)]((n,s)=>n+Fu(s)[o(49)],0)??0)}function iU(e){let t=Tt;return e?[t(37),t(18),e[t(23)],...e[t(39)][t(42)](o=>t(61)+o[t...
Findings
1 Critical6 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalAi Agent Control Hijackscripts/install-skill.mjs
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processdist/review-agent.js
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/review-agent.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/review-agent.js
HighCloud Metadata Accessdist/review-agent.js
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/chunk-QBAD7GAY.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/chunk-QBAD7GAY.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.66.12.
See all versions of @lingjingai/scriptctl for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @lingjingai/scriptctl@0.66.12 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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